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Postpartum depression (PPD) is a fairly common yet often unidentified disorder which 
not only affects the mother, but may also have an adverse effect on the cognitive, 
emotional and social development of her baby. The nature of PPD and whether it may be 
qualitatively different from non-postpartum depression (NPPD) is still disputed. The main 
aim of this thesis is to explore the phenomenon of PPD from the first person perspective. 
In order to deepen our understanding of PPD we compare it with the phenomenon of 
NPPD. The methodological approach towards this aim is descriptive phenomenology as 
outlined by Giorgi. The participants are 4 PPD and 3 NPPD women who were 
interviewed in-depth two to three times about their experience of depression. 
The findings of this thesis are presented in three separate papers. The first paper 
“Two ways of living through postpartum depression” presents two identified essential 
meaning structures of PPD: 1) The looming threatening world and 2) Loss of primordial 
my-ness. In “the looming threatening world” we describe how mothers after birth may 
experience themselves as anxiously thrown into an alienated and threatening world in 
which their inhibited body is perceived as an obstacle for their attunement to their baby. 
The baby becomes a catalyst for feelings of guilt and shame, and they tend to withdraw 
from others into loneliness. In “loss of primordial my-ness” we describe how a mother 
experiences a fundamental feeling of unreality and disconnection both in relation to self, 
the baby, and the social and material world. She experiences a basic loss of ownership of 
her own perceptions, feelings, thoughts and actions. In parallel, the world is perceived as 
unreal, colorless, strange, and robbed of its meaning. Unbearable anxiety accompanies 
this overwhelming feeling of depersonalization.  
 The second paper “Incest and postpartum depression intertwined” is a case study 
which explores how incest experiences in the past constrain perceptions, thoughts, 
emotions and actions in the present. We describe how the birth of a baby girl may re-
actualize and throw a mother into a world of incest where she is overwhelmed by 
intruding fantasies of men who abuse her children. Constantly on guard, she actively 
seeks information about abuse of other children in the media, which in turn feeds her 
anxious vigilance and fantasies. 
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 The third paper “Engulfed by an alienated and threatening body: The essential 
meaning structure of depression in women” describes the essential meaning structure of 
NPPD. We described how NPPD women initially feel entrapped in a personal mission 
that has gone awry. Experiencing her lack of personal resources to resolve the situation, 
the NPPD woman crumbles under the perceived disapproval of others. She doubts her 
own judgments and experiences others’ negative emotions almost as if they were her 
own. Excessive feelings of responsibility are coupled with strong feelings of shame and 
guilt, which lead her to overwork or over-involve herself. In the process she ignores her 
embodied emotions, which gradually become alienated and threatening and in which she 
is ultimately submerged. 
 This qualitative study suggests that the most striking difference between PPD and 
NPPD is that PPD mothers felt in essence disconnected and alienated from the world and 
others (the baby), and in the case of one mother, also in relation to self, whereas in NPPD 
the problem was rather an experienced heightened sensitivity to others’ distress or 
negative judgments. Thus, there may be a difference in the development of PPD and 
NPPD which seems to be centered around two opposites; heightened sensitivity versus 
disconnection. We conceptualized the alienation in PPD as existential depression and 
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“I am not the outcome or meeting-point of numerous causal agencies which determine my 
bodily or psychological make-up. I cannot conceive myself as nothing but a bit of the 
world, a mere object of biological, psychological or sociological investigation. I cannot 
shut myself up within the realm of science. All my knowledge of the world, even my 
scientific knowledge, is gained from my own particular point of view, or from some 
experience of the world without which the symbols of science would be meaningless.” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, p. viii) 
 
1 Introduction 
Giving birth to a child represents a moment in life where the body and existence are most 
intimately intertwined. Pregnancy and birth in themselves represent an extreme and 
existential transformation of the mother’s lived-subject-body-world; how she as subject-
body exists in her lived world and is able to adjust to a world which is abruptly 
transformed by the presence of the all-encompassing vulnerable and helpless infant. How 
can we understand what happens when this existential period in a woman’s life, the 
postnatal period, coincides with the development of depression? 
From a phenomenological perspective the self, body and world are inseparable. 
“To be ill, even with just a trivial illness, as much as with a mortal illness, means, above 
all, to experience things in a different way, to live in another, maybe hardly different, 
maybe completely different world” (Van den Berg, 1972, pp. 45). Van den Berg describes 
how we in illness perceive the world around us in different ways and that the way we 
perceive the world reflects our mode of existence. Thus, the patient’s perception of the 
world is a facet of his or her lived illness. Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962) states that the 
properties of consciousness and the world complement each other and are mutually 
dependent. The way we perceive the world depends on our consciousness. Not only are 
consciousness and the world inseparable, but our consciousness is also inseparable from 
our body, the body-subject (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962). Patients’ awareness of their 
embodied self is bound up with their awareness of the world. Hence, illness and disease 
are not something added on to a person who remains the same; rather they change 
everything; one’s sense of self, body, and the world one lives in. 
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Our mood plays an important part in how we constitute phenomena, how we 
experience our self, our body, and the world (Heidegger, 1927/1996). We do not 
experience emotions in isolation; rather emotions are the atmosphere or tone of our 
perceived world. Our emotional body is the medium through which we gain access to the 
world, providing both the possibilities and the constraints of our existence in the world. 
 Transitioning into motherhood can be said to represent an existential crisis that 
presents women with a number of challenges. Most mothers live through this 
transformational experience without succumbing to depression, but unfortunately for 
some mothers this is a time of despair. How can we best understand postpartum 
depression (PPD)? From a phenomenological viewpoint we first have to describe the 
phenomenon we seek to understand before we try to explain it. The fundamental 
presupposition is that we all share the same human existence and it follows that patients 
share certain essential characteristics that we can describe (Van den Berg, 1972, p. 52). 
Phenomenology does not offer definitions of psychiatric symptoms or an overview of 
syndromes; rather it offers insight into certain modes of being in this world. This 
dissertation is a phenomenological study of PPD which may add important dimensions to 
our understanding of the specifics of the existential crisis experienced by mothers who 
develop PPD. 
 To be able to fully understand PPD, we compare it with depression in women in 
general. We have therefore conducted a separate phenomenological study on non-
postpartum depression (NPPD).  This study of NPPD also provides valuable knowledge 
on depression in women that stands in its own right. However, in this dissertation it 
functions primarily as a tool to compare and sharpen our findings on PPD. A comparison 
of results was enabled by our use of the same phenomenological method for our studies of 
both PPD and NPPD.  
 
1.1 Postpartum depression: The magnitude of the problem 
Prevalence rates of PPD may vary according to definitions of PPD (major and/or minor 
depression, or simply depressive symptoms) and different methods of collecting data 
(self-report or diagnostic interviews). In Norway the prevalence of PPD (defined as 
Edinburgh Postnatal Depression Scale (EPDS) score  10) is reported to be from 8.9% 
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(Eberhard-Gran, Eskild, Tambs, Samuelsen, & Opjordsmoen, 2002) to 10% (Berle, Aarre, 
Mykletun, Dahl, & Holsten, 2003). Using the 28-item version of the General Health 
Questionnaire (GHQ-28), Skari et al. (2002) found the prevalence of clinically important 
depression (GHQ-28: depression subscale case score  2) at 4 days after delivery to be 
6%, and only 1% 6 weeks after birth when controlling for the impact of giving birth to 
infants with serious malformations. This is a somewhat lower prevalence rate than the 
meta-analysis of 59 studies by O’Hara & Swain (1996), where the estimate was 13%. 
Here the method of assessment and period of time under assessment were found to affect 
prevalence rates. Also, studies using a wider window (e.g. the first eight weeks) usually 
reported higher prevalence rates than studies that used a narrower window (e.g. the first 
four weeks). An evidence report (a meta-analysis for the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services) showed a prevalence of major depression as defined by DSM-IV-TR 
(Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, 4th ed., text rev.; American 
Psychological Association, 1994) after delivery ranging from 1.0% to 5.9% at different 
times during the first postpartum year (Gavin et al., 2005). For both major and sub-
threshold (minor) depression the prevalence rate ranged from 6.5% to 12.9% at different 
times during the first year postpartum, indicating that approximately half of the affected 
women experience a major depressive episode and half a minor depressive episode at any 
given time. PPD should be distinguished from postpartum blues and postpartum 
psychosis.  Postpartum blues is the most common puerperal mood disturbance with 
estimates of prevalence ranging from 30% to 75% (O'Hara, Neunaber, & Zekoski, 1984). 
Postpartum psychosis is a rare condition with rates of 0.1-0.2% of all deliveries (Kendell, 
Chalmers, & Platz, 1987).  
Some studies report that the prevalence of depression postpartum is no higher than 
at other times in a woman’s life (Cox, Murray, & Chapman, 1993; Gotlib, Whiffen, 
Mount, Milne, & Cordy, 1989; O'Hara, Zekoski, Philipps, & Wright, 1990), suggesting 
no special link between childbirth and depression. Other studies, however, indicate an 
increased risk of depression in the postpartum period (Eberhard-Gran et al., 2002; Kumar 
& Robson, 1984; Vesga-Lopez et al., 2008; Watson, Elliott, Rugg, & Brough, 1984). One 
study suggests that primiparas have a three times higher risk of hospital admission for 
clinical depression (Munk-Olsen, Laursen, Pedersen, Mors, & Mortensen, 2006). 
Fatherhood was not associated with any increase. The study also indicates a natural 
dynamic process of selection into parenthood. These results are comparable to the results 
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of a study by Eberhard-Gran et al. (2002), who found that women choosing to be mothers 
tend to have good psychic health. In her study, postpartum women originally had a lower 
prevalence of depression compared to non-postpartum women. However, when 
controlling for known risk factors, postpartum women had a higher risk for clinical 
depression. In sum, there seems to be evidence that the postpartum period is a time with 
increased risk for depression in women. Unfortunately, many women suffering from PPD 
are not identified and do not seek professional help (Abrams, Dornig, & Curran, 2009; 
Sword, Busser, Ganann, McMillan, & Swinton, 2008).  
Clinically significant PPD raises unique questions concerning parental function, 
mother-child interaction and the potential harm the mother’s depression causes to the 
infant. Studies show that the sadness, irritability and social withdrawal that characterize 
depressed people have a negative effect on the mother-child dyad, and consequently on 
the emotional, cognitive and social development of the child (Forbes, Cohn, Allen, & 
Lewinsohn, 2004; Murray & Cooper, 1997; Reck et al., 2004; Whiffen & Gotlib, 1989). 
A recent review by Kingston, Tough, & Whitfield (2012) suggests that prenatal and 
postnatal depression may have different adverse effects on child development; prenatal 
depression negatively affects the cognitive, behavioral, and psychomotor development 
whereas PPD contributes negatively to cognitive and socio-emotional development.  
 Over the last two decades there has been an increasing focus on PPD, which has 
had a positive impact in a number of areas including the recognition of depression after 
birth and the fight for improved clinical services for women and their families (Cooper et 
al., 2007). Nevertheless, PPD is still presumed to be an under-diagnosed illness 
(Eberhard-Gran, Tambs, Opjordsmoen, Skrondal, & Eskild, 2003; Horowitz & Cousins, 
2006; O'Hara & Swain, 1996). Despite an increasing amount of research on PPD, there is 
considerable confusion about the definition and even the existence of PPD as a unique 
disorder. Today, the prevailing view is that PPD is no different from depression occurring 
at other times in life, at least from a symptomatic point of view (Cooper et al., 2007; 
Murray & Cooper, 1997; Whiffen, 1991). Research gives conflicting results, however, 




2 What is postpartum depression?  
In this chapter we describe prevailing understandings of PPD. We start by describing the 
diagnostic status of PPD and then present the biological, evolutionary, psychological and 
critical feminist perspectives. 
2.1 PPD: a disorder? 
In the DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) PPD is not defined as a separate diagnostic entity, but as 
a course specifier connected to the diagnostic category Major Depressive Disorder 
(MDD). MDD is defined as PPD if the onset is within 4 weeks post partum. ICD-10 
(International classification of diseases and related health problems, 10th edition; World 
Health Organization, 2004) allows for diagnosing mental and behavioral disorders as 
puerperal if the onset is within 6 weeks after birth. Similarly to the DSM-IV system, 
mental disorders associated with the puerperium should be coded according to the 
presenting psychiatric disorder using a second code (O99.3). A Major Depressive 
Disorder is described as a cluster of symptoms including depressed or sad mood, marked 
loss of interest in virtually all activities, significant weight loss or gain, insomnia or 
hypersomnia, psychomotor agitation or retardation, fatigue or loss of energy, feelings of 
worthlessness or guilt, diminished ability to think or concentrate, and recurrent thoughts 
of death or suicide (APA, 1994). To satisfy the criteria for a major depressive disorder 
(DSM-IV-TR), 5 out of 9 criteria must be met over a period of at least 2 weeks and at 
least one of the symptoms must be depressed mood or markedly diminished interest or 
pleasure.  
But does this cluster of symptoms give a satisfactory understanding of what PPD 
is? The idea that one can identify, separate and cluster symptoms is based on the theory of 
Thomas Sydenham (1624-1698) that nature is uniform and consistent, i.e. that different 
persons that get the same disease will have the same symptoms (Hofmann 2008). The 
classical psychometric view regards observed differences between individuals to be a 
function of an underlying variable. The syndrome of depression is thought to have 
multiple possible causes; psychological, psycho-social, hereditary, evolutionary and 
biological causes. DSM-IV-TR and ICD-10 do not claim to offer an explanation of what 
MDD or PPD is. It is rather portrayed as an atheoretical and value-free taxonomy of 
disorders (APA 2000; WHO, 2004). The classification system is claimed to be the end 
result of a collective enterprise governed by consensus and compromise (Agich 1994). It 
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is pragmatic in the sense that its main goal is to maintain diagnostic consistency, 
efficiency and inter-rater reliability to ensure that this enterprise is coherent with current 
knowledge on the diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders.  
 There are issues concerning these claims that need to be addressed to promote a 
deeper understanding of MDD as a diagnosis. After all, this classification system has an 
enormous impact on people’s life, research, and the distribution of social welfare. The 
fact that a condition is considered as MDD only if it satisfies 5 out of 9 criteria implies 
that none of the criteria are necessary or sufficient for a specific person to have the 
disease. Thus, many different combinations of symptoms can satisfy the criteria for MDD 
and consequently also PPD. The combination of symptoms/criteria that satisfy the criteria 
of a diagnostic entity (an underlying syndrome) can only be reached by counting and 
proceeding logically. They are not seen as interrelated in making up a whole (Gestalt) that 
is qualitatively different from the mere sum of its parts (Kraus, 1994).  Moreover, it is 
pointed out that the different symptoms in themselves do not differentiate successfully 
between essentially different psychiatric phenomena (Kraus, 1991; 2003). Expanding our 
understanding of this problem, Kraus (2003) argues that it is the reduction of psychiatric 
phenomena to consensual symptoms and criteria that makes the diagnostic entities too 
general and imprecise. But at the same time the preference for reliability pushes toward 
discreteness, i.e. the clear separation into different diagnoses. This preference for 
reliability is pressed forward at the expense of internal validity, as experiential 
phenomena are reduced to symptoms and criteria. 
 The statement has been made that our medical classification system is both 
evaluative and heavily theory laden (Agich, 1994). Agich argues that the DSM (APA, 
2000) classification system reflects theoretical commitments through preferences 
regarding principles of causation, explanation, or relation. In accordance with this, Malt 
(1986) points out that the diagnostic system reflects cultural, historical, and social 
preferences and values and changes over time in accordance with these. The DSM, Agich 
proceeds to argue, favors the biological and/or evolutionary perspective. This may also be 
the case for the course specifier of PPD. For a depressive episode to be labeled 
postpartum, it must have occurred within 4-6 weeks after birth. This decision may be 
based on the theory that postpartum depression is mainly caused by hormonal 
dysregulation (physiological view) after birth. This hormonal dysregulation is again 
assumed to be connected to genetic susceptibility (ontological view) (Halbreich, 2005; 
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Jones & Cantwell, 2010). On this basis, one might assume that a preference for biological 
perspectives underlie the criteria for what type of depressions may be labeled as PPD.  
 
2.2 Biological perspective 
How can we best understand and describe postpartum depression (PPD)? In “A treatise on 
insanity and other disorders affecting the mind” from the early 19th century, James C. 
Prichard (1835) described puerperal mental disorders as an imbalance in the vascular 
system after pregnancy in susceptible women. “The conversions or successive changes in 
the temporary local determinations of blood which the constitution under such 
circumstances sustains and requires, appear sufficiently to account for the morbid 
susceptibility of the brain” (p. 312). Especially breastfeeding was thought to excite and 
exhaust the vascular system, which in turn caused melancholia. Since Prichard’s time the 
scientific understanding of PPD has undergone major changes, from a focus on the 
vascular system to specific hormonal changes after birth (Bloch et al., 2000; Bloch, Daly, 
& Rubinow, 2003; Bloch et al., 2005) and genetic susceptibility (Jones & Craddock, 
2007; Mahon et al., 2009; Murphy-Eberenz et al., 2006). The focus, however, has very 
much remained on biological causes inside the body and it is assumed that such causes 
may differentiate PPD from other types of depressions. 
Within this view, PPD is thought to be a real disease (a natural kind or real 
essence, in Locke’s terminology; Locke, 1975) whose underlying causes can be found, at 
least partly, in our biology. Susceptibility to changes in ovarian hormones is presently 
suggested to be one important trigger to PPD (Brummelte & Galea, 2009; Bloch et al., 
2003; 2005). This vulnerability to PPD is assumed to be influenced by distinct familial-
genetic factors (Maguire & Mody, 2008; Murphy-Eberenz et al., 2006) that are suggested 
to be different from those that predispose non-puerperal women to MDD (Cooper & 
Murray, 1995). Several studies have shown that certain genetic factors may reflect a 
susceptibility to PPD (Corwin, Kohen, Jarrett, & Stafford, 2010; Doornbos et al., 2009; 
Jones & Craddock, 2001; Kumar et al., 2007; Mahon et al., 2009; Mitchell et al., 2011; 
Murphy-Eberenz et al., 2006), and how psychiatric diseases (such as PPD) could be 
transmitted across generations (Franklin et al., 2010; Tarantino, Sullivan, & Meltzer-
Brody, 2011). Different genetic factors have been identified (Doornbos et al., 2009; Jones 
& Craddock, 2007; Kumar et al., 2007) indicating various biological systems that may be 
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malfunctioning in women with PPD. This suggests that the genetic base for the PPD 
syndrome is complex in the sense that it does not exhibit Mendelian recessive or 
dominant inheritance that can be connected to one single genetic locus (Skuse, 2001). 
Accordingly, Skuse and others suggest that the focus should be on the latent genetic base 
for traits (endophenotypes) that may be related only indirectly to the classic disease 
symptoms listed in DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000). Also, epigenetics, the interaction between 
the environment and gene expression, has been suggested as an explanation for how 
maternal care can have a persistent effect on the child’s health into adulthood, and 
subsequently influence the child’s maternal care for her own child.  
A growing amount of research provides evidence for dysregulation of hormonal 
changes after birth in a subgroup of women associated with the development of PPD 
(Bloch et al., 2000; 2003; 2005; Brummelte & Galea, 2009; Jolley, Elmore, Barnard, & 
Carr, 2007). The hypothesis is that despite normal reproduction hormone levels, women 
with PPD may respond abnormally to these changes. The researchers therefore assume 
that it is a deviation from the normal biochemical brain activity, especially in the 
hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis, which is associated with PPD (see 
Brummelte & Galea, 2009; Jolley et al., 2007).  
 
2.3 Evolutionary perspective  
Evolutionary scientists, not focusing on the underlying genetic, hormonal and 
neurological causes, are more interested in how nature defines and deals with 
abnormality. Evolutionary perspectives are modern variations of a physiological theory of 
disease that is inspired by Darwin’s evolutionary theory (Boorse, 1976). Boorse is one of 
the most ardent scientists in arguing for the evolutionary standpoint. In this view health 
and disease are defined according to what functions are typically found within members 
of a species. “But behind this conceptual framework of medical theory, a body of doctrine 
that describes the functioning of a healthy body, classifies various deviations from such 
functioning as diseases, predicts their behavior under various forms of treatment, etc. This 
theoretical corpus looks in every way continuous with theory in biology and the other 
natural sciences, and I believe it to be value-free” (Boorse 1976, p. 56).  
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According to evolutionary theory, judgments about health and disease can be 
objectively described in terms of nature. The strong claim is that these descriptions are 
value-free. What does evolutionary theory have to say about PPD? Hagen (1999; Hagen 
& Barrett, 2007) and other evolutionary researchers propose that PPD in some 
circumstances may be adaptive, as women should reduce or eliminate their investment in 
their children if the costs outweigh the benefits. PPD women are found to have fewer 
positive and more negative emotions towards their children, they are less responsive and 
sensitive to infant cues and some have thoughts of harming their children (Beck, 1996; 
2002). Also, PPD is often associated with low social support, infant problems, and a 
history of psychiatric disease (O'Hara et al., 1984). Psychological pain (e.g. depression) is 
portrayed as a necessary motivation to take action to reduce the level of pain. One 
possible way is for the mothers to reduce or eliminate their interest in the children, 
consequently reducing their reproductive costs. Another assumption is that the depressive 
symptoms, especially in MDD, function as a threat to defect from the childrearing 
enterprise if the mother is not given more social support, although Hagen (1999) admits 
that there is little evidence for the latter hypothesis. Nesse (2000) and Nettle (2004), 
looking at NPPD depression, propose that depressive behavior can be perceived as taking 
shelter and staying out of danger, and they hypothesize that such behavior had higher 
benefits for survival for women than for men.  
Depression is, however, often considered as a disadvantage for reproduction. The 
proposed answer from the alternative functionalist view is that depression might be the 
result of a mismatch between genetic variants of older evolutionary origin and the stress 
of modern society. Thus, what was adaptive in the past may not be adaptive in the present 
(Uher, 2009). A more general functionalist argument is that a high sensitivity to stress can 
lead to both negative and positive consequences depending on the environment. For 
example, to be highly sensitive to others’ (the baby’s) distress and needs is generally very 
positive for the health of the offspring under good or optimal circumstances, but the same 
sensitivity also makes women more sensitive to stress and negative life events 
(Oldehinkel & Bouma, 2011). In addition, other evolutionary brain adaptations, such as 
metacognition, may have some maladaptive side-effects, such as a high degree of self-
reproach and ruminations (Gilbert, 2006). A high degree of neuroticism is thought to 
heighten social competitive and pro-social behavior until a certain point where the 




2.3.1 Social evolutionary perspective  
The attachment theory is the best known theory within the social evolutionary 
perspective. This theory proposes that the attachment between the infant and the 
attachment figure is necessary for the survival of the infant and successful reproduction 
(Bowlby, 1953; 1954). Because of the infant’s long-term helplessness, its survival 
depends on the availability and resources of attachment figures. Favored attachment 
behavior that increases attachment figure-infant proximity and leads to greater protection 
of the child is thought to enhance gene survival (Cassidy, 1999). According to this theory, 
we are born with motivational, emotional and behavioral systems whose function is to 
keep attachment figures and infants in close contact to ensure that the infant receives 
appropriate protection, vital resources, and comfort (Gilbert, 2006). Attachment theory 
proposes that the infant through interaction with its caregivers adopts different strategies 
to ensure its protection. When an attachment figure is unable to establish a secure 
attachment with its infant, the infant will eventually suppress the initial anxiety and find 
less optimal ways of being with its attachment figure: it will adapt to ensure its survival. 
These attachment strategies serve as working models for the infant in its relation with 
significant others later in life, and may contribute to the development of depression 
(Fonagy, 1999; Fonagy, Gergely, & Target, 2007). Hence, attachment strategies which 
were functional in relation to a depressed, fearful or preoccupied parent may be less 
adaptive later in life, leaving the individual more vulnerable to depression. Thus, the 
child’s socio-emotional and cognitive development is thought to be affected by early 
patterns of attachment. Attachment is believed to be active throughout the human 
lifespan, but the behaviors that maintain attachment to significant others are thought to 
change according to the different life stages (Ainsworth, 1991).   
 Daniel Stern’s (1995) theory of mother-child interaction overlaps with and 
expands on attachment theory and research. (Here Stern’s theory is positioned under the 
heading social evolutionary perspectives. However, we acknowledge that his theory is 
also informed by other perspectives such as phenomenology). In his book, The 
Motherhood Constellation, Stern (1995; 2004) proposes that new mothers enter a 
“motherhood constellation”, a maternal readiness state, in which the mother’s sense of 
self becomes largely organized around the presence of her baby, the baby’s well-being, 
 11 
 
and the connection between the mother and the baby. While in the motherhood 
constellation, the mother becomes preoccupied by the safety of her baby.  According to 
Stern, the activation of the motherhood constellation also implies that any issue the new 
mother has concerning mothering and her own experiences of being mothered will 
simultaneously be activated. Therapy has to take into account this specific motherhood 
self-organization and how a disturbance, such as postpartum depression, is of necessity 
evident in the nonverbal interactions within the mother-child dyad (or father-mother-baby 
triad).    
 
2.4 Psychological perspective 
Within psychology, we have not been able to identify specific theories regarding the 
etiology of PPD.  There are probably several reasons for this, but one possible reason is 
that psychological researchers view the psychological dimensions of postpartum 
depression as similar to depression in general. There are several different psychological 
theories of depression; however, within the scope of this thesis we cannot account for 
them all. It is pertinent here to describe three dominant psychological perspectives of 
depression as a contrast to the dominant biological and feminist cultural perspectives on 
postpartum depression, namely the cognitive information process, dynamic systems and 
the psychodynamic perspective. 
 
2.4.1 The psychoanalytic model  
The psychoanalytic theory was developed by Freud in the 1890s in Vienna. In 1917 Freud 
published the essay “Mourning and Melancholia” in which he identified two different 
responses to loss - mourning and melancholia. The latter represents a pathological holding 
on to, and internalizing of, the lost object. Sydney Blatt (1974; 1990; Blatt & Luyten, 
2009ab; Luyten et al., 2007), one of the most prominent researchers within the 
psychodynamic tradition, categorized patients into two sub-types: introjective (self-
critical) and anaclitic (dependent). According to Blatt, healthy development consists of a 
balance between needs for independence and needs for interpersonal relatedness, while 
pathology involves an over-emphasis on either dependence or independence and a 
defensive avoidance of the opposing need. In the anaclitic (dependency) personality type, 
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needs are over-focused and are overly invested in closeness, intimacy, nurturance, trust 
and approval seeking, while the introjective personality type is preoccupied with self-
sufficiency, accomplishment, has rigid and often unrealistic standards, and high needs for 
freedom and autonomy. The former type of depression is presumed to be caused by a 
disruption in primary relations, while the latter type is thought to be caused by a harsh, 
punitive, and critical super ego. Anaclitic patients’ coping strategies mostly involve 
avoidant defenses, such as withdrawal, denial and repression, to deal with conflict and 
stress, while introjective patients employ counteractive strategies, such as projection, 
rationalization, intellectualization, doing and undoing, reaction formation and 
overcompensation (Blatt, Quinlan, Pilkonis, & Shea, 1995). Anaclitic patients are 
preoccupied with threats to interpersonal relationships, whereas introjective patients are 
more concerned with defending and protecting a viable sense of self. Consequently, 
failures which disturb their sense of self are more depressogenic for introjective persons, 
whereas ruptures in significant relationships are more depressogenic for anaclitically 
oriented individuals.   
Within the psychodynamic perspective, the transition to motherhood is thought to 
involve challenging issues related to a re-definition of self and other which could lead the 
mother into depression (Antonucci & Mikus, 1988; Belsky, 1991). Priel and Besser 
(1999) hypothesize that self-critical mothers are more vulnerable to depression because 
they are likely to become increasingly self-critical when facing motherhood. In addition, 
pregnancy and childcare are thought to compromise the self-critical woman’s need for 
autonomy. Raphaël-Leff (2001) suggests that pregnancy and childbirth may confront the 
mother with unprocessed traumatic experiences from her past such as loss or mourning. 
He stresses the importance of internal working models in the postpartum period, which 
have their roots in early attachment experiences.  
 
2.4.2 The cognitive behavioral model 
The modern roots of cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) can be traced to the 
development of behavior therapy in the 1920s, the development of cognitive therapy in 
the 1960s, and the subsequent merging of the two (Rachman, 1997). Aaron T. Beck and 
colleagues (1975; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979) developed a cognitive model of 
depression where they suggested that depression is due to distortions in the patient’s 
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perspective. Beck proposed three underlying concepts of depression: negative thoughts 
about one’s self, one’s world and one’s future, distorted information processing such as 
arbitrary inference, selective abstractions, over-generalizations, etc., and recurrent 
negative depressive thinking. Cognitive scientists and therapists focus on cognitive 
schemas and processes as the determining factors in depression. The computer has been 
used as a model in the underlying cognitive theory of mind, and consequently many 
technical terms have been borrowed from computer science, e.g. information processing, 
operator, input, output, etc. (Røseth, 2000). Starting in the 1950s and continuing through 
the 1970s, Lazarus (1958; 1971) developed one of the first forms of broad spectrum 
cognitive behavioral therapy. In the 1980s and 1990s cognitive and behavioral techniques 
were merged into what is now commonly called cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT; 
Rachman, 1997). The criticism of the cognitive behavioral model is that it seems to focus 
on mechanical mental processes and overt behavior, both of which are assumed to be 
learned responses. It has also been criticized for being dehumanizing, much due to its 
standardized and mechanical techniques. The model’s strengths lie in its capacity to 
describe “representational-hungry” phenomena, such as anticipation, memories, etc.  
However, it has not been applied specifically to PPD. 
 
2.4.3 The dynamic systems theory 
Dynamic systems theory (DST) in its modern conception can be traced back to the 1920s 
when von Bertalanffy (1972) argued against the standard atomistic view of science where 
the investigation of single parts and processes were thought to explain the whole. 
Similarly, within psychology, Gestalt psychology argued that psychological wholes are 
not reducible to elementary units such as punctual sensations and excitement in the retina 
(Agre, 1997). DST provides an alternative conceptual framework that emphasizes the 
interaction between organism and environment and stresses that individuals are highly 
integrated self-organizing systems (Kellert, 1993; Kelso, 1995). According to DST human 
behavior is constantly self-assembled anew from dynamic self-organizing interactions 
between multiple levels of organization (Røseth, 2000; Thelen & Smith, 1994). Thus, our 
personality traits, memories and anticipations are not seen as fixed structures or schemas 
somehow stored in our brain. Rather, our more stable personality traits and our memories 
and anticipations may be seen as involving internal control parameters that constrain our 
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ever changing selves. They represent more slowly developing systems on a larger time 
scale (Keijzer, 1997; Varela & Maturana, 1988). 
Stolorow (2003; Stolorow & Atwood, 1997) and Greenberg and Watson (2006) 
have utilized the theory of dynamic systems as a guiding metaphor for the illustration of 
the fluid, context-sensitive, and yet structured and self-organizing nature of mental 
development. (We have placed these authors under DST; however, we acknowledge that 
they are also influenced by other theories and perspectives.) Stolorow and Atwood (1997) 
use DST to reject the “teleological conceptions of preordained end states toward which 
developmental trajectories are presumed to aim” (p. 339). They object to the description 
of mental phenomena as a product of isolated intrapsychic mechanisms and fixed 
intrapsychic structures (p. 339). More traditional psychoanalytic theories, like Blatt’s 
(1974; 1990) theory of anaclitic and introjective personality types, may easily present an 
image of a mind as an internally closed, static and mechanical system which is resistant to 
change. Stolorow stresses the importance of change and interpersonal dynamics to the 
extent that he calls his theoretical viewpoint a “no-person psychology” where mental 
phenomena are formed “at the interface of reciprocally interacting worlds of experience” 
(p. 339). Greenberg & Watson’s (2006) emotion-focused approach stresses that emotions 
are the creative and organizing principle in people’s lives. This approach portrays the self 
not as a constant structure, but as emerging in the moment and constantly changing. They 
propose that a “weak” or “bad” sense of self, associated with basic shame and fear, is the 
core of depression. Depression is thought to set in when emotional schematic memories 
of past feelings of abandonment, powerlessness, and humiliation are activated. The basic 
shame and fear thus function as an organizing principle in the continuing construction of 
the “bad” self. Subsequent treatment involves overcoming the fear of entering the 
maladaptive state and accessing the “bad” sense of self. The idea is that one cannot 
overcome a maladaptive state before one has faced it, making it possible to differentiate, 
elaborate on and symbolize it, and subsequently change. However, this theory has not 
been explicitly related to PPD. 
 
2.5 Critical feminist perspective 
Feminist standpoint theories emerged in the 1970s from Marxist feminist and feminist 
critical theoretical perspectives. Feminist researchers from within the sociological 
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(Nicolson, 1998; Oakley, 1981), and social psychological (e.g. Mauthner, 1999; Nicolson, 
1998; Whiffen, 2004) perspectives criticize biomedical models for their taken for granted 
view of depression as a form of neurobiological, hormonal disturbance or as an intra-
psychological phenomenon that can be understood without regard to the socio-cultural 
context (Gammell & Stoppard, 1999; Ussher, 2010). The wider structural conditions and 
constraints in which new mothers live are highlighted; PPD is linked to the cultural and 
socio-political context (Mauthner, 1999). These feminist perspectives share the standpoint 
that Western culture undervalues and naturalizes mothering practices and they focus on 
how these cultural frames, norms and values contribute to and aggregate difficulties 
brought on by the transition to motherhood. Feminist perspectives on PPD tend to explain 
PPD, and depression in women in general, as a natural reaction to role transition and 
stress (Mauthner, 1999; Whiffen, 1991).  
Feminists often adopt a social constructivist theory of illness, where illness is 
perceived as culturally constructed, and not as a “natural kind”. Feminist researchers tend 
to be critical of the status quo in modern societies and often press for cultural change. In 
line with this theory, feminists often claim that cultural gender role expectations lead 
women into depression (Jack, 1991; Jack & Ali, 2010), or that normal female behavior is 
being pathologized and medicalized as part of the implicit power struggle of Western 
society (Ussher, 2010). In line with the latter argument, certain feminist researchers aim 
to show how women construct a self-understanding in terms of the biomedical model of 
diagnosis and treatment, self-help books, and women’s magazines (Brescoll & LaFrance, 
2004; Gammell & Stoppard, 1999; Lafrance & Stoppard, 2007; Stoppard & Gammell, 
2003). The radical feminist argument is that what is currently labeled as postpartum 
depression is in fact a normal response to motherhood and something that women should 
expect to suffer through (Nicolson, 1998; Oakley, 1981; Romito, 1990). This view has 
been criticized by more moderate feminists for describing motherhood in negative terms 
and for not acknowledging the difference between merely feeling low and being 
depressed (Mauthner, 1998). The radical feminist standpoint has also been criticized for 
valuing paid work outside the home more than motherhood (Nicolson, 1998; Oakley, 
1981; Romito, 1990). Also, feminism can be criticized for being inherently political; their 
aim is not only to describe, but to fight for women’s rights and against what they consider 
to be inequality between men and women. 
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More generally, the social constructivist perspective often argues that women’s 
experiences of PPD are unique and constantly changing, and subsequently that 
generalizations or fixities are undesirable and inappropriate in our attempt to understand a 
phenomenon.  
 
2.6 Additional comments 
The abundance of research on underlying genetic and biochemical causes of PPD reveals 
the strong position of the biological perspective in the field. It has been argued that the 
historical and contemporary tendency in research and the DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) and 
ICD-10 (WHO, 2004) diagnostic classification systems favor naturalistic and objective 
scientific perspectives (Agich, 1994; Hofmann, 2008; Kraus, 1991; 2003). Agich (1994) 
suggests that the preference for objectivity consequently devalues or renounces subjective 
experiential data and ‘Gestalts’.  
The biological and evolutionary perspectives analyze people from the outside, that 
is, from the objective third person perspective (it-perspective). Rollo May (1983) 
described this perspective as grounded in our “Umwelt”, which is the world of natural law 
and includes biological processes, needs, drives and instincts. Many psychological 
theories, like psychoanalysis, cognitivism, behaviorism, as well as dynamic systems 
theories of the mind, are also conducted from the objective third person perspective. The 
cultural feminist perspective adds to this knowledge base by showing how we are 
culturally embedded, and how illnesses such as PPD may be socially constructed. This 
perspective is grounded in our “Mitwelt”, i.e. the world of being with ones’ own kind 
(May, 1983). We are complex organisms with a mind that is embodied, embedded, and 
which has genetic and cultural historicity beyond our own lives. However, the presented 
biological, functional, psychological and cultural perspectives do not sufficiently account 
for the subjective dimensions of postpartum depression, our “Eigenwelt”, i.e. our 




3 What do we know? 
Is there a qualitative difference between PPD and NPPD? Or is PPD just like any other 
depression but happens to be connected to giving birth to a child. In this section we will 
review previous research comparing PPD with NPPD.  
 
3.1 Quantitative studies comparing PPD and NPPD 
We conducted a literature search of studies that compared PPD with NPPD. We identified 
fourteen original studies. These consisted of five retrospective, case-control studies 
(Cooper et al., 2007; Dean & Kendell, 1981; Hendrick, Altshuler, Strouse, & Grosser, 
2000; Katona, 1982; Wisner, Peindl, & Hanusa, 1994), five cross-sectional studies 
(Augusto, Kumar, Calheiros, Matos, & Figueiredo, 1996; Bernstein et al., 2008; 
Eberhard-Gran et al., 2003; Mott, Schiller, Richards, O’Hara, & Stuart; 2011; Nieland & 
Roger, 1997), and four prospective studies (Cooper, Campbell, Day, Kennerley, & Bond, 
1988; O'Hara et al., 1990; Troutman & Cutrona, 1990; Whiffen & Gotlib, 1993). Eleven 
of these studies compared PPD directly with an NPPD group, whereas three studies 
compared PPD indirectly with data from separate studies on NPPD (Bernstein et al., 
2008; Cooper et al., 1988; Mott, et al., 2011). The sample size of the PPD group in the 
case-control studies ranged between N = 26 and N = 96, and in the population based 
studies between N = 95 and N = 483. 
 Although all but one study reported differences in clinical symptoms, no 
consistent differences were reported. The inconsistencies may be explained partly due to 
different samples, but more importantly because of major differences in assessment 
methods (different psychiatric interviews, physician-rated scales and self-report 
questionnaires). None of the methods applied cover the whole spectrum of depressive 
symptomatology (e.g. melancholia, atypical depression, bipolar subtypes). In addition, 
differences in the definition of postpartum depression (e.g. 6 weeks, 6 months; 1 year) 
and variation in the types of depression addressed (e.g. major depression only; minor and 
major depression, symptom severity beyond a specific cut-off) preclude comparison 
across studies and possibilities for merging of findings. In our opinion, current 
quantitative studies are so diverse that consensus on the presence of differences in clinical 




3.2 Qualitative studies on PPD and NPPD 
We have been unable to identify a qualitative study that compared the lived experiences 
or meaning structures of PPD versus NPPD. We found however a substantial amount of 
qualitative studies on depression in women grounded in a social constructivist approach, 
e.g. critical feminist and discursive perspectives. These studies typically stress the role of 
cultural narratives (Mitwelt) concerning the female role (Ussher, 1992; 2010) or 
motherhood in the development and course of depression postpartum (Abrams & Curran, 
2010; Amankwaa, 2003; Everingham, Heading, & Connor, 2006; Mauthner, 1998; 1999; 
Nahas & Amasheh, 1999; Nicolson, 1990; 1999). According to these studies, the common 
conception of the good mother raises unrealistic expectations, which subsequently clash 
with the reality of motherhood, leading the mother into depression (Berggren-Clive, 1998; 
Leung, Arthur, & Martinson, 2005; Mauthner, 1998; 1999; Nahas & Amasheh, 1999; 
Nicolson, 1990; 1999).  Phenomenologically inspired studies on postpartum 
depression have identified various experiential themes, such as the loss of a former sense 
of self, autonomy and time, and the loss of former appearance, femininity, sexuality, 
occupational identity, support and control (Beck, 1992; 1996; Mason, Rice, & Records, 
2005; Wood, Thomas, Droppleman, & Meighan, 1997). In one study by Beck (2002), the 
respondents used metaphors like “drowning”, “sinking deeper and deeper”, “spiraling 
down”, and “falling through the air” to describe their growing distress and feelings of 
being totally overwhelmed by the demands of the baby. “Spiraling through a series of 
emotions including feeling trapped, angry, panicked, and isolated” (Wood et al., 1997). 
Some studies describe ambivalent feelings and a lack of bonding with the baby (Beck, 
1996; Sluckin, 1998). Other studies stress the significance of past life experience, e.g. 
abuse (Mason et al., 2005), lack of partner support (Mason et al., 2005), and guilt for 
being depressed and thus not being able to properly care for one’s child (Hall & 
Wittkowski, 2006).  
 Beck (2002) conducted a metasynthesis of 18 qualitative studies. There were only 
two criteria for inclusion in the metasynthesis: (a) The focus of the study was PPD, and 
(b) the research design was qualitative. The included studies employed widely different 
definitions of PPD (ranging from subjectively experienced stress to diagnosed MDD) and 
different timeframes for depression onset after birth (6 weeks to 12 months). The 
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metasynthesis revealed 4 overarching themes on the basis of the central concepts found to 
be essential by the researchers in the studies: (1) Incongruity between expectations and 
reality of motherhood, (2) spiraling downward, (3) pervasive loss, and (4) making gains. 
In Beck’s metasynthesis, she portrayed the development of PPD as a downward spiral of 
depression beginning at various times during the postpartum period (first 12 months after 
birth). Many of the women in these studies were interpreted as having unrealistic 
expectations of motherhood, which were shattered by the reality of their own life as 
mothers. This in turn made them feel overwhelmed, perceiving themselves as failures as 
mothers, which consequently produced a terrible burden of guilt. Metasyntheses are 
important in the quest to make qualitative data from several studies more uniform in order 
to make a stronger claim for generalization of the results. However, it should be noted 
that metasyntheses analyze the researchers’ analyses and not the patients’ raw data and 
will thus reflect the perspectives and focus of the researchers who conducted the studies.  
Qualitative studies on depression in women, not limited to PPD, have revealed 
that social isolation, feelings of loneliness, and concern about self in relation to others are 
central themes. Scattolon (2003) explored major themes in women’s experiences of living 
with and managing depression. She found that women experienced depression as filled 
with feelings of isolation and aloneness, that they were unable to carry on as usual, and 
that they were “going on” for the sake of others. Rice et al. (2011) found that depressed 
women’s difficulties with social interaction involved a lack of interest in others, that they 
were too emotionally overloaded to interact, that they feared being a burden, and that 
others would not understand them.  
To our knowledge, there is a paucity of original studies on PPD aimed at 
describing the phenomenon as a whole (Gestalt). Rather, previous studies have identified 
important themes that women may experience, and seemed to focus more on what (the 
content) the women experienced than on how (the structure or form) the women 
experienced the phenomenon. Thus, they show more interest in the mothers and their 






4 What is next? The departure point for this study 
Despite a substantial amount of research, the connection between childbirth and 
depression is still unclear. One question that remains is whether there might be a 
qualitative difference between depressed postpartum and non-postpartum women in the 
way they perceive their lifeworld. Is there a difference in how PPD and NPPD women 
perceive their lived body, the other person, the world, and time? The question of ‘how’ 
these women deal with difficulties in their everyday life can perhaps give the most basic 
essential meaning structure of postpartum depression. Such essential meaning structures 
may aid the development of instruments that help identify early symptoms of depression, 
both in postpartum and non-postpartum women. 
 This dissertation presents studies that take heed of the coherence and integrity of 
these experiences. We will thus go beyond a description of essential themes or symptoms 
(see Section 3) and describe the essential meaning structure of both PPD and NPPD and 
interface the essential descriptions to reveal similarities and differences (Giorgi, 2009). 
Our claim is that phenomenology can offer a scientific analysis and description of various 
essential pathological modes of being. 
 
4.1 The phenomenological perspective 
The word phenomenon originates from the Greek word “phainomenon” meaning to ‘show 
itself’ (Heidegger, 1927/1996). One task of phenomenological philosophy is to discover 
essences based upon a direct description of our experience as it is, without projecting 
theories of its psychological origin and the causal explanations of biology, sociology and 
history (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962). Phenomenological philosophy originated with 
Husserl (1913/1962) and was developed further by Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962) among 
others. Husserl (1913/1962) opposed both relativism (psychologism, sociologism, and 
historicism) and rationalism (logicism). He claimed that psychologism leads to relativism 
and irrationalism because it implicitly describes the thoughts and principles of the mind as 
only the result of external causes (automatic conditioning), thus holding the position that 
truth cannot be found (relativism). Through a radical reflection (the phenomenological 
reduction), Husserl sought to transform the automatic conditioning into a conscious 
conditioning of the mind.  
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“By a truly radical reflection, which reveals the prejudices established in us by 
the external environment, he [Husserl] attempts to transform this automatic 
conditioning into a conscious conditioning. But he never denies that it exists and 
that it is constantly at work.” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p.48-49) 
 
Merleau-Ponty (1947/1964) described Husserl’s phenomenological reduction (the 
epoché) as motivated as follows: “From the mere fact that he desires not only to exist but 
to exist with an understanding of what he does, it follows that he must suspend the 
affirmations which are implied in the given facts of his life.” (p. 49). At the same time 
Merleau-Ponty stressed that to suspend these affirmations is not the same as “to deny 
them and even less to deny the link which binds us to the physical, social, and cultural 
world. It is on the contrary to see this link, to become conscious of it. (p. 49)  
 Through suspending the affirmations of the existence of reality (the epoché) and 
thereby adopting the phenomenological attitude, Husserl (1913/1962) studied the 
essential structures of consciousness. In the course of his phenomenological studies he 
found that many acts of consciousness demonstrate that consciousness is conscious of 
something; it is intentional. It is directed towards an immanent object (e.g. memories, 
fantasies or hallucinations) or a transcendent object (an object in the physical world). 
Husserl (1913/1962) pointed out that all phenomena are a product of both the intentional 
act (noesis) and the intended object (noema), thus phenomena are in essence relational 
and context dependent. Giorgi (2009) points out that the term intentional act is better 
understood as actualization rather than activity: “consciousness makes objects come 
present. It actualizes presences” (p. 105). Moreover, from a phenomenological 
perspective our emotions and our body are inseparable (which we will refer to as the 
“emotional body”) and our emotions permeate our world (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962; 
Toombs, 2001). Emotions are described as a certain action readiness or bodily 
engagement with the world. In our natural attitude towards the world, however, we by 
default take the existence of things for granted and treat them as objects largely 
independent of our own perception and embodied emotions. This tendency to be 
Cartesian dualists can easily be understood because our lived bodies, by which we are 
given access to the world, are largely invisible for us (Leder, 1990). 
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 In his seminal book “Phenomenology of Perception”, Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962) 
stressed that “phenomenology is the study of essences”, but he equally stressed that 
phenomenology puts essences back into existence (p. vii). It is a philosophy in which the 
understanding of man and the world is based on their ‘facticity’ in a world that is ‘already 
there’ before we start to describe and reflect on it, and all the efforts of this philosophy 
“are concentrated upon re-achieving a direct and primitive contact with the world, and 
endowing that contact with a philosophical status” (p. vii). Essences belong to our 
everyday world, and are not added or constructed by the researcher. In this study we use 
the phenomenological method to describe individual subjectivity. Phenomenological 
essences are the most invariant meanings that account for the empirical variances in the 
data. Phenomenological essences are “the structural invariance within variance, that 
which gives shape and coherence to the variance” (p. 29). Thus, phenomenology attempts 
to show how an experience, although individual and singular for one person, may also be 
shared and generalized.  
 Phenomenology opens up to the study of bodily experience, the interpersonal 
context of lived happenings, the temporal dimension of what we live through, and self as 
the centre of all that takes place within the lifeworld. Husserl’s philosophical program 
formed the anchor for Giorgi’s (1970; 2009) endeavor to formulate a psychological 
phenomenological research approach. Giorgi’s approach is the method used in the three 
phenomenological studies in this dissertation. Phenomenology does not try to explain 
illness, rather it seeks to describe and illuminate inherent complex meaning structures that 
are constituted in the interface between our intentional consciousness and the world. From 
a phenomenological point of view, Kraus (1994; 2003) argues that intuitively grasping a 
psychopathological Gestalt already has an important role to play for our classification 
system, only in an immanent and pre-scientific way. This intuitive grasping of a Gestalt 
has been described as the “praecox feeling” that experienced clinicians have before 
diagnosing patients. Another concept that captures the mode of presence of phenomena is 
physiognomy (Cloonan, 2005). The phenomenological method aims at a scientific study 
of this ‘grasp of the whole’, the experiential Gestalt. It has as its main focus the very 
experience that precedes and enables our theories and scientific endeavor.  
 The phenomenological claim is that consciousness with its “irreal” objects (which 
do not exist as real objects in nature) does not obey the laws of natural science, and that it 
therefore should be studied through human science. When we deal with experiential 
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phenomena, such as the experience of being depressed, we first and foremost deal with an 
idiographic and unique experience. However, this unique experience also possesses more 
general and essential properties. These essences are not understood as universal, but as 
contingent essences that pertain to their cultural and causal context. Earlier 
phenomenologists like Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Van den Berg, Sartre and others give 
important insights that have the potential to enrich and move forward modern psychiatry 
and psychology. They conducted painstaking phenomenological analyses of the essential 
structures of consciousness that provide the philosophical and epistemological fundament 
of the different phenomenological perspectives. 
 
4.2 Aims 
The main objective of the current study is a phenomenological exploration of the essential 
meaning structure of postpartum depression through the lived experience of women. In 
order to deepen our understanding of postpartum depression, we separately explore the 
meaning of depression in women outside the postpartum period, and then compare the 
two phenomena to reveal differences and similarities. The aim of this phenomenological 
study is to describe the phenomenon, i.e. the essential meaning structures of postpartum 
and non-postpartum depression. In doing so, we move beyond the idiosyncratic meanings 
towards the implicit, more general meanings that encompass the different experiences of a 
number of women. Further, we intend to reflect on these essential meaning structures in 
the context of the phenomenological thinking of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and others, 
and discuss our findings in relation to the contemporary theoretical and empirical context 




5 Method  
5.1. Phenomenological study 
This qualitative study was grounded in descriptive phenomenology (Giorgi, 1970, 1985, 
2009). The epistemological frame is Husserlian phenomenology with the aim of 
contributing to a deeper and broader understanding of PPD and NPPD and the similarities 
and differences between them. Phenomenology is not limited to the description of 
idiosyncratic experiences; it is designed to reveal the implicit meaning structure of the 
phenomenon. 
“A phenomenology, therefore, has a double purpose. It will gather together all the 
concrete experiences of man which are found in history - not only those of 
knowledge but also those of life and of civilization. But at the same time it must 
discover in this unrolling of facts a spontaneous order, a meaning, an intrinsic 
truth, an orientation of such a kind that the different events do not appear as mere 
succession.” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 52) 
 
5.1.1 Interviews 
The phenomenological researcher begins with collecting detailed descriptions of concrete 
experiences of the phenomenon as experienced by others. It is important that the 
descriptions are concrete and not more general and abstract narratives which lack the 
complexities of pre-reflective experience.  
 In our studies we chose to use in-depth interviews. The participants were 
interviewed two to three times, with each interview lasting from 45 to 90 minutes. The 
interviews were performed at a venue chosen by the participant, six preferring to be 
interviewed in the researcher’s office while one woman preferred her own home. Before 
each interview we spent time to establish rapport with the participant before the recorder 
was put on. At the beginning of the interview we invoked the phenomenon, provided 
some orientation, but did not direct the participant to any specific topic. Through our 
questions we sought clarification or requested elaboration on specific experiences that 
were pertinent to the phenomenon, i.e. the development and experience of PPD and 
NPPD. Each interview was transcribed verbatim. Interviews provide the researcher with 
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the possibility of obtaining very rich data about the phenomenon (Kvale, 1996). The 
advantage of being both a therapist and a researcher has been noted by both Kvale and 
Finlay (2009a). As a therapist the interviewer is trained in creating a safe context for the 
interview in which to gain access to the participants’ experiences.  
 A potential pitfall with the interview as a method is that the researcher may not be 
able to create a secure environment. There is a danger that the researcher is too 
preoccupied with her own experiences or preunderstandings during the interview to create 
an emotional attunement to the participant’s lived meanings. One result of this lack of 
attunement may be that the researcher will tend to pose leading questions in order to get 
the participant to say certain things that the researcher is looking for (Giorgi, 2009). 
Following Husserl (1913/1962), an important part of the research process is to bracket 
one’s prior knowledge about the phenomenon, meaning that the researcher performs the 
phenomenological reduction. 
5.1.2 The phenomenological reduction 
Husserl developed a phenomenological method that involves putting aside, or 
“bracketing”, theoretical and practical preconceptions and assumptions about the 
phenomenon to be studied. Within the natural attitude, received views can be helpful. It is 
transferring the natural attitude to the phenomenological attitude that is erroneous 
(Husserl, 1913/1962; Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962). The second main meaning of the 
phenomenological reduction is to withhold the existential claim, meaning that we suspend 
belief in the existence or “reality” of that which is under investigation. Facts are reduced 
to phenomenal presences. Hence the term reduction, which in this context does not mean 
to diminish but to restore or return something to a more primordial mode (Applebaum, 
2004). In the case of a question such as “Are the depressed mother’s feelings about the 
world justified?” Husserl would put it aside to focus instead upon the appearance to 
consciousness. The human subject can describe how she experiences what presents itself 




5.1.3 Selection of subjects 
5.1.3.1  PPD participants 
We included only the mothers who satisfied the diagnostic criteria for major depression 
(MDD) according to the diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, DSM-IV-
TR (APA, 2000), and whose depression developed within three weeks after birth. All new 
mothers in any part of Norway routinely come into contact with the local health care 
clinics at two weeks postpartum. For ten months in one municipality, local health care 
nurses invited all new mothers who could read and write Norwegian to take part in the 
study. In this period 464 babies were born. A total of 305 mothers gave written consent to 
join the study and completed the Edinburgh Postnatal Depression Scale, EPDS (Cox, 
Holden, & Sagovsky, 1987), at two and six weeks postpartum. The EPDS forms were 
coded, enclosed in envelopes and sent directly to the researcher, who then contacted by 
phone those women scoring  13 within two weeks of the first score above cut-off for 
additional EPDS assessment. 21 women scored over cut-off at either 2 or 6 weeks 
postpartum and were further evaluated. Of these 21 women, only 6 had an MDD that 
developed within three weeks. One of these chose not to join the study and two were 
excluded due to short duration of depression (less than 3 weeks) and uncertainty 
regarding diagnostic status. In parallel, we also unsystematically recruited mothers from 
two psychiatric outpatient clinics. One mother was referred and recruited from one of the 
outpatient clinics.   
 Our final selection consisted of four women, two of whom also met the criteria for 
melancholic depression (ICD-10 terminology: somatic syndrome; WHO, 2004). Three 
women had normal deliveries, while one had a cesarean section. Two mothers were 
primiparous and two were multiparous; of the latter one gave birth to twins and one had 
given birth twice. Three of the women had no prior psychiatric history, while one woman 
had suffered clinical depression and anxiety earlier in life. At the time of the interview 
only one of the women was receiving psychotherapy. She also took medication for her 
depression. The age of the women at interview was between 20-45 years. All were 
cohabiting with or married to the father of the newborn.  
 We judged the descriptions of the participants to be large enough to provide rich 
and diverse data on the phenomenon and small enough to enable detailed and 
sophisticated analysis. Giorgi (2009) claims that descriptions are adequate if they contain 
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sufficient depth and detail to reveal new psychological knowledge about the phenomenon 
(Giorgi, 2009).  
 
5.1.3.2  NPPD participants 
We unsystematically recruited women from two psychiatric outpatient clinics and from 
two local GP practices in two Norwegian municipalities. Eligible women were asked to 
participate in the study by their GP or therapist. Women who agreed to participate were 
contacted for further assessment. They were excluded if they were pregnant or had given 
birth to a baby within the last year. We included only women who satisfied the diagnostic 
criteria for major depression according to the diagnostic and statistical manual of mental 
disorders, DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000).  
 After the recruitment and inclusion of three women with diverse and rich 
descriptions of NPPD, we determined that we had sufficient data for a descriptive 
phenomenological method. We had thus made a purposive selection to ensure that we 
could get rich data on the phenomenon (Polkinghorne, 2005). All three women satisfied 
the criteria of MDD and one of them also met the criteria for melancholic depression 
(DSM-IV-TR criteria; APA, 2000). Two of the women had no children, while one had a 
preschool child. Two of the women had no prior psychiatric history, while the third had 
experienced a previous depressive episode. At the time of the interview one of the women 
was receiving psychotherapy and taking medication for her depression. Their age was 
between 20-45 years. All were in relationships, but only one was living with her partner. 
 
5.1.4 Data analysis 
We analyzed the interviews using Giorgi’s descriptive phenomenological method (1970; 
2009). We started by adopting the phenomenological attitude: bracketing our 
preconceptions about the phenomenon and withholding the existential claim. Within the 
phenomenological attitude, we analyzed the interviews in four logical steps: First we read 
the whole transcript of each interview several times to get a sense of the whole. Secondly, 
for each interview we divided the transcript into meaning units by being sensitive to and 
marking shifts in the psychological meaning of what was said. Thirdly, we transformed 
each meaning unit into psychologically sensitive language, where the more general 
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meaning was identified by imaginative variation. During imaginative variation we probed 
the descriptions, trying out different levels of categorizations and thereby finding 
invariant meanings that can encompass facts from several individuals. In our analysis we 
read between the lines and teased out the coherence between explicit and implicit 
meanings in the descriptions. In the fourth and final step we synthesized the transformed 
meaning units of all the descriptions by the participants into an essential structure. For the 
sake of analysis, this essential structure can be separated into essential constituents. It is 
important to note that these constituents are highly interrelated and can only be fully 
understood as part of a whole Gestalt. 
 
5.2 A phenomenological case study 
During the research process we were intrigued by the intertwining of the incest 
experience with postpartum depression in one of the participants, i.e. how her incest 
experience in very significant ways formed her present perceptions, thoughts, feelings, 
and anticipations of the future. From the perspective of a clinical psychologist, we found 
her story of critical importance for our knowledge of the possible implications of incest 
postpartum. But we also wanted to find out whether her description provided more 
general knowledge of how trauma in the past may haunt us in the present and future. 
Thus, by going deep into the complex and intertwined experiences of one well chosen 
case, we hoped to find more general knowledge, indeed an eidetic structure.  
 The works of Merleau-Ponty, Minkowski, Van den Berg and Freud are based on a 
number of well chosen case studies. They picked pathological cases which functioned to 
render the familiar unfamiliar (Romdenh-Romluc, 2011). Within traditional natural 
science, qualitative research and case studies in particular have been considered useful 
only for generating hypotheses that later may be tested systematically with a large number 
of cases. In this view, case studies cannot in themselves provide generalizable knowledge. 
Flyvbjerg (2006) argues that this view is based on fundamental misunderstandings and 
claims that case studies indeed can generate general knowledge, albeit not statistical 
generalizations. He claims that delving deeply into the intricate patterns of one case can 
give important insight into more general patterns and that critical cases may also be used 
to test hypotheses. Kvale (1996) suggests two reasons why significant knowledge from 
one case may reveal knowledge generalizable to larger groups. Firstly, quantitatively each 
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case may contain a large number of concrete descriptions of the phenomenon. Secondly, 
qualitatively, the focus on one single case enables the researcher to describe in detail 
consistent and recurrent patterns in the relationship between the individual and the 
situation.  
 Our case was chosen because it was especially rich and detailed, giving unique 
access to the lived intertwinement of incest and postpartum depression.  We strove to 
illuminate the complex, implicit, and contextualized meaning structure through one 
mother’s experience.  
 
5.3 Ethics 
The participants received information about the study both verbally and in writing. They 
were assured confidentiality and any information in the transcribed interviews that might 
reveal any person’s identity has been changed or removed. The participants gave their 
informed consent both verbally and in writing to take part in the research project. They 
were informed of their right to withdraw from the study at any chosen time without 
stating a reason. The Norwegian Regional Committee for Medical Research Ethics had 





6.1 Paper I: “Two ways of living through postpartum depression” 
In Paper I we identified and discussed two essential meaning structures: the looming 
threatening world and the loss of primordial my-ness. 
 
6.1.1 The looming threatening world  
In the essential meaning structure “the looming threatening world” we present and discuss 
PPD as entering a looming threatening world. Crumbling under a world perceived as 
dangerous, the mother fears for her baby’s safety. She is tormented by a painful feeling of 
insecurity and anxiety that infiltrates normal everyday activities. Her anxiety is nourished 
by her own emotional past and present; however, she is mostly unaware of this process. 
The lived body manifests itself as an obstacle by its heaviness and lack of energy. She 
feels out of touch with the world, the baby, and other people. Painfully aware of this 
alienation, she tries to convince herself rationally of her love for the baby. Being unable 
to live up to her own expectations regarding love and care for her baby makes her 
vulnerable to the gaze of others. She feels guilt because she perceives her mothering skills 
as inadequate, and she feels shame because she perceives herself as inferior or bad. She 
transforms her experience of time into guilt for missed opportunities for loving and caring 
for her baby. She also grieves her baby’s loss of a loving caring mother. Anxiety or strong 
feelings of guilt and shame make the woman conceal her true thoughts and feelings and 
withdraw from social others. Although desperately in need of help to care for the baby, 
she often interprets support as a confirmation of her failure as a mother. In constraining 
herself by isolation she feels ambivalent. She fears social situations, but at the same time 
she feels terribly lonely, and thus longs for good social relations which she hopes can 
relieve her pain. 
Within this essential meaning structure, we identified six constituents: 1) The vulnerable 
baby and the threatening world; 2) perforated, anxious self and motherhood; 3) the lived 
body as a heavy physical obstacle and a mother’s attunement; 4) the baby as a catalyst for 
guilt, shame and remorse; 5) ambivalence concerning practical support and positive 




6.1.2 Loss of primordial my-ness 
PPD can alter the basic feeling of my-ness. After the birth, the mother experiences sudden 
and repetitive lapses into intense feelings of unreality and disconnection both in regard to 
self, the baby, and the social and material world. In experiencing a distorted sense of 
basic my-ness, or primordial self-awareness, she loses her fundamental sense of owning 
her perceptions, emotions, thoughts and actions. Rationally she knows that they belong to 
her, but she is unable to feel it. Unbearable anxiety precedes and accompanies this 
overwhelming feeling of depersonalization and alienation. Fundamentally cut off from 
her normal self, she perceives the world as colorless, strange, alien, and robbed of its 
meaning. She relentlessly ruminates on why this has happened to her. She despairs over 
being trapped, never able to escape this alienation and regain her normal self.  Within this 
essential meaning structure, we identified three constituents: 1) unreal world and others; 
2) unreal self; and 3) unbearable anxiety. 
 
6.2 Paper II: “Postpartum depression and incest intertwined: A case study” 
The contextualized meaning structure of study II revealed the structural intertwinement of 
incest and postpartum depression through a particular case. For “Nina”, PPD means to be 
thrown into a world full of men who abuse children. Before giving birth she could keep 
traumatic memories of incest at the fringe of her daily life consciousness. After giving 
birth she is overwhelmed by an anxious vigilance and intruding fantasies of men who 
abuse children. Her fantasies merge with recollections of her incest experiences. This 
intertwined Gestalt of memories, fantasies and experiences is so painful that she hardly 
ever succeeds in keeping it out of her consciousness, and as a consequence it has an 
enormous impact on her daily life; it alters her perceptions, thoughts and emotions, i.e. 
her entire mode of existence. Overwhelmed, Nina succumbs into fatigue and sadness. Yet 
childhood sexual abuse (CSA) experiences of unknown people interest and attract her. 




 Within this contextualized meaning structure we revealed three constituents; 1) 
from maintaining distance to overwhelming closeness; 2) the attraction of the world of 
abuse; and 3) difficulty separating self from baby. 
 
6.3 Paper III: “Engulfed by an alienated and threatening emotional body: The 
essential structure of depression in women” 
The essence of Study III showed that NPPD in women is experienced as ultimately being 
engulfed by an alienated and threatening emotional body. A mission, initially embarked 
on with hope and emotional investment, has backfired and is now experienced as a major 
source of distress that the woman feels unable to abandon. Feeling trapped in this 
negative situation over an extended period of time, she finds herself lacking the necessary 
personal resources to resolve the situation. She is strongly affected by the perceived 
disapproval of others concerning her situation, which throws her into ambivalence, doubt 
and excessive worry. She experiences others’ feelings and judgments almost as if they 
were her own, temporarily invalidating or subordinating her own feelings and judgments. 
Feelings of excessive responsibility are coupled with feelings of shame and guilt which 
can be traced back to negative experiences in her past. Despite the experience of 
hopelessness about changing the distressing situation, she feels deeply responsible for the 
emotional well-being of others. Her mission is to succeed in her goal, to satisfy others’ 
demands and to relieve her intense feelings of shame and guilt. However, this is achieved 
by ignoring and suppressing distressing and negative embodied emotions. Consequently 
these suppressed emotions grow awry and are experienced as forced down upon her in 
increasingly unexpected and frightening ways; there are feelings of sickness, fatigue, 
sadness, panic attacks or inner restlessness, which also deprive her of sleep. Gradually she 
becomes less able to fulfill the responsibilities that she has claimed or accepted, thus 
adding to her burden of shame and guilt. Deep inside the feeling of unfairness about her 
situation frustrates her and negatively affects her relationship with others, which again 
produces more feelings of guilt. Eventually she experiences a breakdown as she is 
forcefully submerged in her emotional body. 
For the sake of further analysis the above essential meaning structure is delineated 
into six constituents: 1) Entrapment in a mission; 2) Engulfed by others’ pain and 
negative judgment; 3) The present constraint of past guilt and shame; 4) Ignoring 
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embodied emotions; 5) Anger and feelings of injustice; 6) Becoming submerged in a 




7 Discussion of methodological issues 
Research findings should be trustworthy and evaluated within the framework of the 
epistemological assumptions that underpin the procedures used to generate the findings 
(Stige, Malterud, & Midtgarden, 2009). Accordingly the methodological ideals of validity 
and reliability, so pertinent to quantitative research, may need to be considered when 
applied to phenomenological research.  
 
7.1 Trustworthiness in phenomenology 
Giorgi (2002) argues that quantitative research is based on empirical philosophy in which 
two epistemological assumptions underpin validity: 1) All knowledge must be based on 
perceptual experience, and 2) knowledge must be of the event “in it-self” (p. 5). From 
within this perspective, Giorgi argues, the apprehension of the subject is intrinsically 
distorting. In quantitative studies, the credibility of a study depends on the quality of 
instrument construction, while in phenomenological studies the researcher is part of the 
method. Furthermore, whereas in quantitative research reliability and validity are viewed 
as separate issues, in phenomenological research they are encompassed by broader terms 
such as credibility, rigor, and trustworthiness (Kvale, 1996). As a result, the 
methodological quality of qualitative research is often approached by addressing 
subjectivity, reflexivity, and social interaction in the interview process. Thus, within 
qualitative research, to validate is perhaps best understood as to reflexively investigate, 
check, question, and theorize about the nature of the phenomenon (Kvale, 1996). 
There have been several more or less successful attempts to generate an 
integrative checklist to assess the methodological quality of qualitative research across 
different qualitative methods from different scientific perspectives (e.g. Elliott, Fischer, & 
Rennie, 1999; Malterud, 2001; Stige et al., 2009). For example, the checklist provided by 
Elliot et al (1999) includes criteria such as explicitly stating one’s perspective, situating 
the sample, grounding findings with quotes from the data, different types of credibility 
checks, coherence and resonating with readers. The danger in generating and advocating 
such checklists is that they may favor one qualitative method at the cost of others. Also, 
some of these checklists (e.g. Elliot et al., 1999) seem to lean on quantitative ideals when 
they advocate the need for many participants to be able to generalize, or triangulation of 
methods as a credibility check of findings. Stige et al. (2009) proposed seven general 
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themes (EPICURE) indicative of quality; this is conceivably the most integrative of these 
guidelines/checklists as it permits different methodologies to place more weight on 
certain themes and less on others. In my view it is appropriate to allow different scientific 
perspectives to define scientific quality from within their own epistemological 
frameworks. However, two particular criteria seem more generally applicable across 
different qualitative methods: to explicitly state one’s perspective and to be 
methodologically coherent. Methodological coherence is especially important when 
considering the validity of findings; the research question and methodological steps are to 
be coherent with the proclaimed scientific perspective (Morse, Barrett, Mayan, Olson, & 
Spiers, 2002).  
 In Husserlian phenomenology, one does not seek to eliminate, but to clarify, the 
role of subjectivity. Phenomenology aims to understand the conditions under which valid 
or correct knowledge can be obtained. We may overimpose our subjectivity on, or be less 
present to, the phenomenon and thus present distorted findings. Thus, what matters is how 
the researcher is present to the phenomenon under study (Giorgi, 2002). ”There is only 
knowledge for a human subject who apprehends it” (Giorgi, 2002, p. 9); it is impossible 
for us to know things in themselves. This proposition raises the question of how we can 
gain access to the conscious experience of others. Husserl (1913/1962) answers this by 
assuming that consciousness has certain shared essential structural features which on the 
individual level are varied and idiosyncratic (see the section “Essential meaning structures 
versus themes or idiographic descriptions” below). 
 Husserl developed a phenomenological method that involves putting aside, or 
“bracketing”, theoretical and practical preconceptions and assumptions about the 
phenomenon under study. Bracketing is an important methodical step that we have 
explained in the method section and which we will discuss in further detail later. 
Following Husserl (1913/1962), we utilized bracketing to ensure that our analysis was 
true to the phenomenon under study. In our analysis of the data we followed the rigorous 
methodological steps developed by Giorgi (2009) to ensure that the whole description 
was analyzed in a manner that could be repeated by other phenomenologists from within 
the same perspective. Also, quotes from the interviews clarify and illustrate the analysis 
to the reader or other researchers. 
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One implication of using qualitative methods is that one cannot make statistical 
generalizations based on the results. However, one can claim to make what Kvale (1996) 
has termed analytical generalizations. An analytical generalization is a reasoned judgment 
of whether and how the findings of one study could be used to understand what may 
happen in another situation. In this thesis the results have been lifted by eidetic reduction 
from the particular and idiographic to a more general and essential level (Giorgi, 2009) 
which makes it reasonable to assume that the findings will be useful for our 
understanding of PPD and NPPD women in other situations. Furthermore, we will 
critically discuss our research in the light of available theories on (postpartum) depression 
that are relevant for our findings. Also, the usefulness and transferability of our findings 
has been and will be critically evaluated by ourselves, the researchers, and by the readers, 
such as peer-reviewers, other researchers and clinicians (Kvale, 1996). Thus, in our 
research we strive for knowledge that is general, systematic, critical, and methodical as 
defined by Giorgi (2009).  
 
The issues of validity, reliability, credibility, trustworthiness and transferability are tightly 
interwoven with the theory of science and epistemology. Research has to be evaluated 
from within the perspective and research paradigm in which it is designed and conducted. 
Also within phenomenology there are disagreements about how we can have access to 
knowledge. Questions such as “is all description necessarily interpretation?”, “is 
bracketing possible or even desirable?” or “do essences exist?” involve pertinent issues 
regarding the conceptions of subjectivity and scientific trustworthiness or rigor. These 
issues are frequently discussed, especially in the form of a polemic between interpretive 
and descriptive phenomenology. We will address this polemic in the next section. 
 
7.2 Descriptive versus interpretive phenomenology 
Today, there exist many researchers with widely different research methods and 
techniques who call their research phenomenological. All phenomenologists agree that 
phenomenological research deals with subjective experience, but there is a continuous 
debate about the researcher’s stance in the research process, about whether the focus of 
research should be on essential meaning structures or on themes and idiographic 
38 
 
descriptions, and regarding what methodological criteria, if any, should be applied in the 
research process. A major part of this debate concerns whether phenomenology is best 
understood as a critical modernist (descriptive phenomenology) or a constructivist 
(interpretive phenomenology) view of science.  
 Interpretive phenomenologists, mainly inspired by Heidegger (1927/1996) and 
Gadamer (1991) tend to focus on the relation of the individual to his lifeworld and 
contend that people are inevitably and fundamentally influenced by the world they live in. 
Interpretation is understood to be rooted in the fore-structure of projection of Dasein, and 
since this fore-structure precedes our reflective understanding of the world, understanding 
is always interpretation. In interpretive phenomenology interpretation is often understood 
to apply in a broad and undifferentiating manner to all forms of knowledge and to 
correspond to the claim that all knowledge is constructed (Applebaum, 2011; 2012). 
Applebaum points out that from the hermeneutic perspective “research is not so much 
meaning-discovery as it is meaning-making, a creative enterprise engaged in 
collaboratively with research participants (2012, p.9). Thus we can develop a plausible 
but contingent line of meaning attribution for a phenomenon, but never argue for its 
exclusivity. Other plausible accounts could also be given. From this perspective the 
modernist project of the Enlightenment is considered outdated and naive, and the 
interpretive or social constructive stance is, implicitly or directly, presented as the only 
right answer. However, descriptive phenomenology is also presented as a viable 
alternative to objectivistic mainstream science, without simultaneously embracing 
constructivism (Giorgi, 1992; 2009). 
 Both Husserl (1913/1962) and Giorgi (2009) acknowledge that the 
phenomenological psychological approach is perspectival; it adopts a particular point of 
view which is constitutive; the researcher constitutes the research process.  However, to 
acknowledge consciousness or science as constitutive is not identical to believing that 
consciousness constructs its objects, nor that science necessarily alters its objects in 
grasping them scientifically (Applebaum, 2012). The researcher grasps a phenomenon 
from a certain perspective, acknowledging that there are other possible perspectives that 
can be described. Husserlian phenomenologists employ a narrow definition of 
interpretation in their research, where they believe in a meaningful distinction between 
description and interpretation, which is ignored in over-simplistic claims such as “all 
knowledge is interpretation” or that “all description is interpretation” (Applebaum, 2012; 
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Giorgi, 1992).  Descriptive phenomenology involves the belief that we can, from within a 
given perspective, describe whatever presents itself to consciousness, however incomplete 
and ambiguous it may be. Unlike interpretive phenomenology, descriptive 
phenomenology does not strive for the best interpretation of this incompleteness and 
ambiguity; it seeks to describe this incompleteness and ambiguity as it is given to 
consciousness.   
 
In the following sections we present some of the discussions between interpretive and 
descriptive phenomenologists; 1) phenomenological reduction and reflexivity; 2) essential 
meaning structures versus idiographic descriptions; 3) detailed methodological steps 
versus integrative (eclectic) flexibility. 
 
7.2.1 Phenomenological reduction and reflexivity 
Recent proponents of the interpretive phenomenological approach argue for a greater 
focus on the constructive and relational aspect of the research process in itself; among 
these Finlay (2010) is prominent. We may note that there are other interpretive 
researchers that operate in a similar manner to the steps in Giorgi’s method and that the 
difference between them lies mostly in their epistemology. 
Finlay (2002; 2005; 2010), argues for a reflexive phenomenology and proposes that research data 
does not ‘speak for itself’ but is co-constructed in the researcher/co-researcher encounter (Finlay uses the 
term co-researcher to underscore the participants active role in knowledge creation). She stresses that the 
researcher should stay in reflexive contact with her own sensations, emotions, thoughts and fantasies while 
being open to, and staying with, the other in empathy. Finlay claims that the relational dynamics (both 
conscious and unconscious) between researcher and co-researchers should be emphasized and explored in 
phenomenological research (Finlay & Gough, 2003). Subsequently the data analysis focuses not only on the 
description given by the co-researcher, but also on the emergent dynamics of the research relationship as 
reflected on by the researcher. She explains that her relational approach employs theoretical concepts from 
existential phenomenological philosophy, Gestalt theory, relational psychoanalysis, and intersubjectivity 
theory.  
Giorgi (2010) generally opposes this application of different theories to the 
Husserlian phenomenological stance, in which the researcher should refrain from 
applying theory (the phenomenological reduction). Also, Giorgi claims that the struggle 
for the understanding that knowledge is a mutual product emerging from the interview 
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situation is not original as it is already implied in the concept of intentionality and is the 
foundation of any scientific enterprise. Giorgi (2010) further states that the argument for 
co-construction of meaning in the research situation overlooks the fact that the 
researcher’s role is not the same as that of the participant. The phenomenological 
reduction implies both withholding the existential claim and bracketing one’s 
preconception of the phenomenon at hand (as we have explained earlier in the method 
section). Thus phenomenological researchers seek to minimize their presence to enable a 
full focus on the participant’s experience. This does not imply that the researcher should 
become a tabula rasa (“blank slate”), but that she or he can put theories and 
preconceptions about the specific phenomenon ‘out of play’ in order to be open to the 
way the phenomenon presents itself to the researcher’s consciousness. In therapy one 
employs interpretative guesses about what is going on, but in research such prompts could 
redirect what the person was intending to say, and thus confound his or her original 
perspective.  
 
7.2.2 Essential meaning structures versus themes or idiographic descriptions 
Phenomenologists differ in what they believe should be the focus for research: 
interpretive researchers often seek to describe lived experience articulated in idiographic 
descriptions of cases, with themes of a varying degree of generality, whereas descriptive 
researchers seek more invariant meaning structures through the phenomenological 
reduction and imaginative variation (Giorgi, 2011). Interpretive phenomenologists often 
accentuate the richness and diversity of the data and tend to resist the articulation into 
more general structures (Giorgi, 1992).  
The aim of descriptive phenomenological psychology is to explicate the general 
meaning structure(s) and their relationship to the individual and idiographic experiential 
objects. This process is often referred to as the eidetic reduction. The descriptive scientist 
seeks to articulate the more integral knowledge that lies implicit in the descriptions. 
Through reflective inquiry the researcher seeks to uncover and clarify implicit and partly 
concealed meaning that lies in the medium range between particularity and universality. 
One seeks to tease out the unified meaning and describe it precisely as it presents itself to 
consciousness. This description of the general meaning structure is not a substitute for 
variety, but is a means of accounting for it (Giorgi, 2009; 2010). Giorgi stresses that 
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descriptive phenomenology seeks to describe “variations of an identical meaning and not 
variations as opposed to unity”. Essential identical meanings are called constituents to 
indicate that they are integrated into the essential meaning structure. All of the themes and 
idiographic meanings discovered by the interpretive approach form an integral part of 
these constituents and can be referred to. In order to facilitate access to the unified 
meaning, or general meaning structure, one employs free imaginative variation and seeks 
diverse descriptions of the phenomenon under investigation (Giorgi, 2009). A closely 
similar approach is lifeworld phenomenology (Dahlberg & Halling, 2001). The 
underlying assumption of these perspectives is that our intentional relation with the world 
has certain shared characteristics that we can describe.  
 Descriptive phenomenology has been criticized for being a realist modernist 
project where there is a belief in fixed and static immutable properties, i.e. essences that 
can be described. Phenomenologists claim that this is a fundamental misunderstanding, 
since phenomenology describes essences as relational, dynamic, fluid and ambiguous 
(Giorgi, 2009). In fact, phenomenological philosophy initially evolved as an alternative 
and a critique of modern natural human science. Phenomenology opposes the idea that we 
can have objective knowledge of the world in itself, and argues that all knowledge has to 
go through consciousness. According to both Husserl (1913/1962) and Giorgi (2009), 
knowledge does not represent fixed, universally true and complete meanings. Knowledge 
is always incomplete and dependent on the researcher’s perspective. However, Giorgi 
proposes that “meanings can be objectively understood even if they are subjectively 
established” (p. 80). Note that Giorgi uses the term objective to convey the idea that 
meanings can be intersubjectively identified.  
 
7.2.3 Systematic procedures versus methodological eclecticism  
In our two main studies where we sought to describe the essential meaning structures of 
PPD and NPPD (paper I and III),  we followed Giorgi’s (2009) method step by step. In 
our case study, however, we chose to use a single case to explicate the intertwinement of 
incest and postpartum depression. Thus, here we diverged from Giorgi’s method in which 
he recommends that at least three participants should be included. Giorgi claims that the 
researcher ideally needs more than one, and preferably three to four participants, to 
achieve a sufficient number of variations in order to draw out the invariant meaning. To 
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use his method on only one participant in order to arrive at an essential structure draws 
heavily on imaginative variation, as it is more difficult to separate the idiographic from 
the more general knowledge. Our discussion of the existing theories on the topic indicates 
that our findings are useful for understanding PPD mothers with childhood traumas. In 
addition the usefulness and transferability of these findings have already been and will be 
evaluated by peer reviewers, researchers and clinicians. 
Some concern has been raised about the use of specified steps when conducting 
qualitative research as it poses a danger of valuing the steps more than reflecting on the 
methodology used (Giorgi, 2009). Cheek (2008) worries that the emphasis on 
methodological steps may reduce qualitative methods to a mechanical employment of a 
set of data collection techniques and that the steps thus become synonymous with the 
qualitative method. This poses a real threat; there are examples of the employment of 
certain phenomenological steps, without making evident any knowledge of, or reflection 
on, the philosophy that shapes the way a particular method is considered. Several 
phenomenologists (e.g. Finlay, 2009a; Smith & Eatough, 2007) argue for a flexible and 
eclectic use of methodological steps. 
 It is clear that any method can be abused, also Giorgi’s (2009) descriptive 
phenomenological method, but this is not an argument for not applying one. Having no 
methodological steps poses a greater threat. It may support the idea that ‘anything goes’ 
and that phenomenology is a personal rather than an intersubjective and scientific 
enterprise (Giorgi, 2011; 2010). A description of the methodological steps used in a study 
renders research more transparent, enabling others to critically examine the research and 
if desired perform similar studies. Without a clear and specific method this becomes 
impossible. Qualitative research is sometimes presented as an individualistic personal 
enterprise where one is free to conduct research in any way that fits the individual 
researcher best (e.g. Finlay, 2009b). Giorgi (2010; 2009) and others (Norlyk & Harder, 
2010) argue against this open and flexible version of phenomenology and claim that 
certain criteria need to be followed in order for the research to qualify both as science and 
phenomenology. Giorgi (2010) claims that if qualitative research methods are presented 
as so open to improvisation that they are not capable of producing systematic knowledge, 




7.3 Additional comments 
Phenomenological philosophy has contributed two methods to the human sciences: an 
interpretive and a descriptive method. The interpretive method requires the researcher to 
come up with a meaning to account for the data (Applebaum, 2011). The descriptive 
method requires the researcher to tease out and articulate meanings that are already in the 
data. Some interpretive approaches consider the research process as a collaborative 
creative enterprise jointly constructed by the researcher and research participants. 
Descriptive phenomenology is based on the belief that we can, from within a given 
perspective, describe whatever presents itself to consciousness, however incomplete and 
ambiguous it may be. Subsequently some interpretive phenomenological researchers 
argue for a greater focus on the constructive and relational aspect of the research process 
in itself, whereas the descriptive phenomenological researcher seeks to minimize his or 
her presence to enable a full focus on the participant’s experience. Interpretive researchers 
often seek to describe lived experience articulated in idiographic descriptions of cases or 
themes of varying degrees of generality, as opposed to descriptive researchers, who seek 
to describe a more general and invariant meaning structure, i.e. the phenomenon. 
Interpretive phenomenologists tend to present research as a personal enterprise where one 
should be free to conduct research in any way that fits the individual researcher best (e.g. 
Finlay, 2009b; Van Manen, 1990), whereas Giorgi (2010; 2009) and others (Norlyk & 
Harder, 2010) argue against this open and flexible version of phenomenology and claim 
that there are certain criteria that need to be followed in order for the research to qualify 
both as science and phenomenology.  
The researcher’s choice of method in qualitative research is not arbitrary; it has 
strong connections, implicitly or explicitly, to the philosophy of science. The method that 
one adopts carries assumptions about epistemology, theories regarding what type of 
knowledge we can possibly have about ourselves, others, and the world. We will not 
argue for one right or one wrong way of performing scientific, especially 
phenomenological, research, but we agree with Giorgi (2010), Norlyk and Harder (2010) 
that researchers should clearly state the philosophical perspectives that constrain and give 






8 Discussion of results 
The overall aim of our research is to explore the phenomenon of postpartum depression 
from a phenomenological perspective. In this section we will first discuss separately the 
most essential findings of our studies on PPD and NPPD in Papers I, II and III.  In the 
articles we have discussed the essential constituents in the different meaning structures as 
they are interconnected to a whole. Here we will discuss the various aspects of this whole 
that are pertinent to our understanding of the phenomenon. Secondly, throughout the 
discussion we will use theories that are pertinent to and may elaborate on our findings. 
Thirdly, in order to illuminate and sharpen our findings on PPD and NPPD further, we 
compare the different essential meaning structures, emphasizing differences and 
similarities.  
 
8.1 Paper I: “Two ways of living through postpartum depression”  
In Paper I we present and discuss two different essential meaning structures: 1) “The 
looming threatening world” and 2) “The loss of primordial my-ness”.  
 
8.1.1 The looming threatening world 
The first essential structure encompassed three women. The most striking finding in our 
phenomenological exploration of PPD is the sudden alienation and desynchronization 
experienced by mothers in relation to their world. The exploration of this essential 
meaning structure underscores the experienced vulnerability and anxiety experienced by 
depressed mothers. The perceived vulnerability of the baby catalyzes the change in the 
lived world for the mothers. They fear that they might not be able to protect their baby 
from the perceived dangerous world. When succumbing to depression the mothers 
experienced a sudden change in their lived world from a familiar atmosphere into a 
looming sense of ‘unhomelikeness’ and danger. We found that the mothers feel anxious, 





Table 1: PPD, Structure 2, development: 
This finding is supported by other studies that found mothers often to be troubled by 
excessive worry or anxiety (Phillips, Sharpe, Matthey, & Charles, 2009; Ross, Gilbert 
Evans, Sellers, & Romach, 2003). Also, Phillips et al. (2009) found that even though the 
mothers’ symptoms of anxiety do not qualify for an anxiety diagnosis, 10.8% experience 
what they called maternally focused worry which was experienced as equally debilitating. 
  We explored how these frightening and deeply disturbing experiences can be 
described as an existential crisis where the previously familiar world is suddenly rendered 
alien and unpredictable. All the habitual routines that gave a feeling of being at home, 
both in the world and in oneself, have been wiped away by the birth of the baby, resulting 
in an existential anxiety where the mother feels vulnerable and wide open to attacks at 
any moment. Although the focus of the external threat is the baby and not the mother, the 
death of the baby would mean the death of motherhood which is now central to her self 
and her being. It is revealed to her how little she can take for granted and how vulnerable 
the baby and she are in relation to the perceived threats from the environment.  
To deepen our understanding of the mothers’ anxiety in the face of this looming 
and threatening world, we enriched the descriptions with the thinking of Kierkegaard, 
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Sartre, Heidegger, and Tillich. According to Kierkegaard (1844/1981) and Sartre (1956) 
anxiety is the natural reaction when we are faced with the abyss of freedom. Freedom is 
experienced when our habitual and pre-reflective ways of dealing with the world 
disintegrate and we are faced with nothingness. Sartre stated that human beings are not 
things, but essentially emptiness (no-thing). We exist and in the process we create 
ourselves. However, we strive to have substance; to act as if we were a fixed set of being. 
Sartre stresses that we subsequently are fundamentally responsible for the projects that we 
choose to engage in. This realization is deeply anxiety provoking and may lead to what 
Sartre calls inauthentic preoccupation with projects. Similarly, Heidegger (1927/1996) 
described anxiety as the result of the encounter with our own fundamental isolation in the 
world. This realization is brought about by the inevitability of our own death, but also by 
existential death which is experienced in frustrations, disappointments and losses. Tillich 
(1952) distinguished between existential and neurotic anxiety. Existential anxiety 
concerns our inevitable finiteness, namely death. Our own insufficiency and possible 
failure reveal to us that we are mortal and open up the horizon of our death. Tillich saw 
neurotic anxiety as a cover for the real existential predicament that we all face. Neurotic 
anxiety is described as the result of one’s inability to live courageously despite existential 
anxiety. Thus, one escapes into neurosis and ceases to develop in order to avoid the 
inevitable terror of freedom and one’s own death. “Neurosis is the way of avoiding 
nonbeing by avoiding being” (Tillich, 1952, p. 66). It should be noted that others, such as 
Heidegger and Sartre, used the term existential anxiety to also include what Tillich called 
neurotic anxiety. Thus these concepts may have different meanings when used by other 
scientists and philosophers. 
In the discussion of the looming threatening world we explored how transitioning 
into motherhood can be understood as a process where we strive to adjust and gain access 
to a ‘new’ world. Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962) described how we inhabit and integrate our 
world and how our body extends itself through our familiar objects; they become 
integrated in our self. Lang (1984), building on Merleau-Ponty’s thinking, portrays the 
disruption of our familiar world as a transition where one is introduced to a new access to 
the world. He uses the door as a metaphor to illustrate the difference between a habituated 
and familiar world in contrast to an alien, unfamiliar world. If we stand in front of a house 
belonging to strangers, as opposed to the inviting and benevolent transparent door of our 
own house, the door represents a solid obstacle. It is a barrier which appears closed to our 
48 
 
entering, a massive object that demands attention for its own sake. The depressed 
mothers’ experience of the looming threatening world can be understood as an unresolved 
transition where the once familiar world has lost its original meaning and where they 
stand before the door of a new world but feel rejected and threatened and experience 
themselves as unable to cross the threshold. The world which once was lived as an 
extension of self is now perceived as representing obstacles making movement in the 
world difficult. Subsequently the mothers are unable to acquire a new access to the world. 
This disturbance in spatialization (feeling disconnected) is concomitant with a disturbance 
in temporalization (desynchronization) where they no longer seem to be directed towards 
a future but rather locked in the past. The depressed mothers are stuck in limbo, 
temporarily unable either to go back to the world as it was or to enter the new hidden 
world that looms ahead. According to Lang, our practical projects and desires (our future) 
are curtailed as we are denied access through the door, and we become obsessed by it; we 
sit by the door and occupy it. This metaphor illustrates the mothers’ preoccupation with 
the looming dangers in the world; at the same time as they fear this world, they feel 
drawn to it.  
We described in Paper I how the mothers, when faced with this looming and 
dangerous world, experience a shift in how their body relates to the world. Their body 
which earlier resembled more a transparent medium through which they gained access to 
the world has become more like a physical object which obstructs them in its heaviness. 
Their obtrusive body was experienced as inhibiting their attunement to their baby. 
Subsequently, the desynchronization in depression and anxiety in PPD is experienced 
through the disturbance in the mothers’ sophisticated attunement to the baby’s embodied 
communication and needs. The communication between the mother and baby, which 
Stern (1995) characterizes as rhythmic and melodic interaction and mutual resonance, is 
disturbed and the mother feels unable to fully integrate the vulnerable baby in herself; the 
lived synchrony with the baby and others is disturbed. This is often verbalized as caring 
for the baby in a mechanical way, experiencing this as difficult and straining. Instead of 
the mother moving in the world dynamically with the baby, the infant presents as an 
obstacle to gain access to the world. Often the mother tries to solve problems analytically 
when relating to the baby in the world, as opposed to experiencing the world as inviting 




8.1.2 Loss of primordial my-ness 
The second essential meaning structure “Loss of primordial my-ness” in Paper I 
represents a significantly more radical and fundamental feeling of disconnection than 
Structure 1(the looming and threatening world). This essential meaning structure is based 
on the description of the case of only one woman. We find that experiencing a loss of my-
ness involves feeling that one no longer exists as oneself in the world. One’s perceptions, 
thoughts and actions are experienced as alien, as not belonging to oneself; one has lost 
oneself. The depressed mother described herself as an absent person, as a walking 
shadow. We revealed how the mother’s lack of primordial sense of agency for basic 
perceptions, feelings and thoughts created a vast abyss between her, the baby and the 
environment. She felt fundamentally cut off from others and the real world. Her newborn 
baby, her husband and the house they lived in felt equally unreal and as belonging to 
someone else. The mother’s loss of primordial my-ness and her fundamental 
disconnection from the world were connected to an extreme form of anxiety, in which 
suicide was felt as a last option to escape. 
Minkowski (1970, p. 334) described a partly similar type of depression, 
“ambivalent depression”, which he analyzed as a disturbance in lived time. Minkowski 
pointed out that in this type of depression the dynamic integration of past, present, and 
future is lacking. The past is experienced as static memories and no longer felt to be the 
dynamic source of the present. Likewise the future is experienced as isolated visions of 
what will happen, not as vitally bursting forth from the present. Minkowski claimed that 
the patients suffering from ambivalent depression fail to unite these dimensions of time, 
which, he said, in reality cannot be separated at all.  
Our analysis reveals that the experienced increasing disconnection from the body 
and world is synonymous with the sense of loss of self. The world loses meaning for the 
mother, it loses its ‘expressive force’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 342), and 
reciprocally she loses her sense of self. How we perceive others mirrors our mode of 
consciousness, i.e. how we exist in this world. Minkowski (1933/1970) proposed that a 
disturbance in the experience of achievement in the world (which he terms “ambient 
becoming”) could also easily lead to a feeling of perturbation in our relations with the 
environment. The morbid dualism between the patient and his world as seen in the 
patient’s functional incapacity to reach others is connected to a disturbance in his lived 
time, or “ambient becoming”. As Minkowski wrote, “I reach the ambient world through 
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my activity; the act or the work which it produces detaches itself from the ego and 
becomes inserted in the non-ego the moment that it is completed, while it nevertheless 
remains the ego’s” (p. 347).  
Minkowski (1933/1970) understood the ambivalent depression as an endogenous 
depression, different from e.g. reactive depression. According to Tellenbach (1961/1980), 
the endogenous aspect does not only refer to the rhythmic relationship between the 
somatic and psychic spheres, but also to our relationship with the world, i.e. our normal 
tendency to adjust and synchronize our biorhythm to the rhythm of the world. In 
melancholy this harmonious relationship with the world is broken (In Ambrosini, 
Stanghellini, & Langer, 2011).  
 
8.2 Paper II: “A case study of a mother’s intertwining experiences with incest 
and  postpartum depression” 
In Paper II, we explored the contextualized meaning structure “Incest and postpartum 
depression intertwined”. We described how incest in the mother’s childhood may form 
and constrain her whole existence after giving birth to a baby girl and how it in 
fundamental ways affects her perception of and relation to events and persons in everyday 
life. Thus, we find that disturbance of lived time is of essential importance for our 
understanding of postpartum depression.  
 
Husserl’s phenomenological description of time perception enriched our understanding of 
how we live time, how we can experience a coherent self and that things and events 
endure over time (Van Gelder, 1999). An event is perceived to have endurance because of 
the triple structure of consciousness: retention (an intentional awareness of past events), 
primal impression (an intentional awareness of what is happening now), and protention 
(an intentional awareness of future states).  Retentions and protentions are not conceived 
of as representations, but rather as aspects of direct experience, as an intentional 
directedness. In addition to this basic lived duration, we also have memories of past 
events and anticipate future events. Heidegger (1927/1996) describes how the past, 
present and future are highly interconnected and that the past and future are a part of the 
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current phase of consciousness. Heidegger stresses that we approach the future on the 
basis of our past, and that the past and the future form the present.  
This phenomenological description clarifies how our participants’ past informs 
their anxiety about the future and how, being depressed, they live and grieve this future in 
the present (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: The frozen present 
Our case study describes in detail how incest in one’s childhood may form one’s 
whole existence. It affects in fundamental ways how one perceives events and people in 
everyday life. It is not only the content of one’s feelings and thoughts, but the very 
structure of one’s perceptions and anticipations that is affected. The object-horizon 
structure of our consciousness described by Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962) clarifies how 
events from the past can lie in the horizon of our consciousness and yet color our whole 
existence. Merleau-Ponty made extensive use of Gestalt psychology to deepen his 
understanding of our perception of the world. In his object-horizon structure, our 
perceptions, thoughts, and feelings fluctuate from being in focus to lying at the fringe of 
the experiential horizon. The meaning of our conscious focus is dependent on, and 
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sensitive to, its horizon. Merleau-Ponty explains how new perceptions and emotions may 
replace the old ones, but that the underlying and implicit structure of the experience may 
still remain the same. The case study illustrates that we are not normally unconscious of 
an earlier trauma, but choose not to address it directly. As Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962) 
describes “Forgetfulness is … an act; I keep the memory at an arm’s length, as I look past 
a person whom I do not wish to see” (p. 162). New events, such as the birth of a baby girl, 
may change and reorganize our perception of the world where earlier traumatic memories 
may once again dominate in our attempt to create meaning. Stolorow & Atwood (1997) 
put forth the idea of a dynamic unconscious which involves affective states that have been 
defensively aborted or walled off and in which the boundary between the conscious and 
unconscious is fluid and ever shifting, depending on the changing context. 
  
In Paper II we explored how PPD for one mother who has experienced incest involved the 
repeated re-experience of the incest through the anticipated future of her children. The 
results of our case study show that not only may PPD women repeat traumas by 
anticipation, they may also actively seek information of others’ traumas through the 
media, etc. We explored different scientific understandings of this compulsion to repeat 
the predicaments of our past. From a psychoanalytic perspective, this re-entry into a 
world of abuse may be interpreted as the unconscious need to master a trauma and the 
unresolved unconscious conflicts by wanting unconsciously to go through the same 
situation, hoping turn the bad object (i.e. the incestuous father) into a good object 
(Fairbain, 1986). Instead of basing our approach on unconscious conflicts and goals, we 
prefer a phenomenological and dynamic systems theoretical interpretation. We found that 
the traumatic or negative ‘memories’ that dominated the participant’s life were not 
conceptualized as representational, but rather lived “as a manner of being and with a 
certain degree of generality” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 83).  
We explored how depression intertwines with anxiety. The mother dreaded the 
anticipated future abuse of her children. In anxiety we live in expectation of an 
anticipated dreaded world that closes in on us from the future (Minkowski, 1970). 
Minkowski stresses that expectation is a suspension of activity, which for him is equal to 
“life itself”, and therefore implies intense anxiety (p. 88). Because we cannot bear to stay 
in anguish over time, we must engage in action. In anxious depression we may act in an 
attempt to reduce overwhelming anguish when we seek information about what we fear. 
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But unfortunately, the action of seeking information often does not overcome our 
uncertainty; instead it feeds and colors the expectation, creating more intense anguish. 
Our anguish-creating actions stall time and curtail our future, which Minkowski described 
as an important aspect of depression. We described how anxiety and depression can be 
two sides of the same coin. We can understand the mother’s dread (anxiety) and 
grievance (depression) of the future as inauthentically dealing with her traumatic past. 
Our description of lived time in depression revealed that the past, present, and future are 
highly interwoven, and determine each other in intricate ways.  
 
8.3 Paper III: “Engulfed by an alienated and threatening body: The essential 
structure of depression in women” 
In Paper III, we present and discuss the essential meaning structure of NPPD. We 
describe how the women in our study felt entrapped in a personal mission that had gone 
awry and become a major source of distress. Feeling that they lacked the personal 
resources to resolve the problematic situation, they were strongly affected by the 
perceived negative emotions and thoughts of others (see Figure 3). Scheler (1912/1970) 
and Minkowski (1933/1970) describe our sensitivity to others’ emotions and sympathy as 
a vital contact with our fellows that is rooted in the living body and not a product of 
analytic inference (a construction) of a detached free-floating mind (Scheler, 1912/1970, 
p.10). Empathy is vital because it enables us to understand and anticipate the behavior of 
others. It denotes a fundamental positive ability to come into contact with and to get to 
know other human beings. However, as our analysis revealed, when the emotional pain 
involved in empathy is unbearable, the focus changes from care for the other to one’s own 
painful feelings. The ability to separate negative feelings that belong to self from negative 
feelings that belong to others is compromised (Scheler, 1912/1970). The basic human 
power of sensitivity has flipped over and become a weak point. This increased sensitivity 
to others’ emotions and judgments, combined with a high degree of self-criticism, led the 
women to neglect or ignore their own emotional bodies which they perceived as obstacles 
in their fight to succeed in their mission. Over time they became gradually more alienated 
from an increasingly threatening emotional body. Eventually they became engulfed by it 
and broke down into depression. This reveals some of the complexity of our empathic 
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Figure 3: NPPD development 
 The depressed NPPD women in Paper III often perceived others as critical and 
condemning, and they ascribed these feelings as belonging to others and not to their own 
particular way of relating to the world (mood). In order to relieve their excessive feelings 
of guilt, they worked hard to make amends and to gain others’ approval. Consequently, as 
our analysis revealed, they suffered from the negativity that they themselves had assigned 
to the other. The mental states of others vicariously felt by our participants may be said to 
be at least partially imagined, but nevertheless felt very real to them. Their perception of 
the critical other is pre-reflectively co-created by their consciousness (the intentional act 
of consciousness) and the perceived other (the object of consciousness). We implied that 
the distinction between self-centered and other-centered focus, which is often considered 
to represent different types of depression, is meaningless in this context because how we 
perceive others (interpersonal sensitivity to other’s negative emotions) reflects how we 
perceive ourselves (self-criticism). Thus these two dimensions are intimately connected; 
they are inextricable aspects of being in the world.  
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 The NPPD women in our study were troubled by a core shame, a deep feeling of 
being a ‘bad’ or ‘weak’ person.  They also felt excessively guilty for imagined or real 
transgressions. Shame and guilt have been proposed as the core of depression and the 
creative and organizing principle in people’s lives (Greenberg & Watson, 2006). The 
shame and guilt experienced by the women with NPPD made them engage in repetitive 
and critical examinations, so-called ruminations, of themselves, their actions and others’ 
feelings and judgments towards them. The extreme feeling of guilt was coupled with a 
feeling of excessive responsibility which made the women overwork or emotionally over-
involve themselves to the extent that they surpassed their own resources. 
Shame is differentiated from guilt; shame involves devaluing the self as weak or 
bad in the eyes of the other, whereas in guilt it is only one’s behavior that is devalued 
(Lynd, 1961). When tormented by guilt we suffer feelings of regret and responsibility. In 
shame we feel self-conscious and suddenly exposed and bared to the penetrating critical 
gaze of ourselves and others (Sartre, 1939/1962). Shame involves a feeling of 
estrangement from our lived bodies and social others, and subsequently a suspension of 
immersion in a world full of projects. We suggested that the women in our study tried to 
shrink shame to manageable proportions through assuming themselves to be guilty, and 
subsequently tried to make amends (Connor, 2001). One result of turning shame into guilt 
may be excessive overworking or over-involvement as described by the women in our 
study.   
 
In Paper III, we described how the NPPD women in our study felt trapped and powerless 
in their current situation and how they after an intensive but futile struggle to change their 
predicament became overwhelmed and submerged in their alienated and threatening 
emotional body. Sartre (1939/1962) pointed out that when our possibility to change the 
world through pragmatic action is blocked, we may try to change the world by “magic”. 
Sartre explains that in order to change the world, we may pre-reflectively try to change 
ourselves either by minimizing or exaggerating the difficulty of the world. Our study 
revealed how the women in our study experienced periods of anxiety, such as panic 
attacks and massive death anxiety. They seemed to exaggerate the difficulty in the world 
and perceive the world as unjust and hostile because it demanded too much of them. 
Sartre interprets this as a non-reflective abandonment of responsibility because it 
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eventually puts them in a state where no further action is possible. In addition to periods 
with massive anxiety, they had periods with feelings of emptiness and numbness, in 
which their world was perceived as devoid of meaning. Sartre describes this as an act of 
self-protection against the unbearable by turning away from the world and thereby taking 
away its significance. 
  
8.4 Comparing PPD and NPPD 
In this section we aim to compare the three essential meaning structures: “The looming 
threatening world”, “Loss of primordial my-ness”, and “Engulfed by an alienated and 
threatening emotional body”.  When analyzing the descriptions of PPD and NPPD 
women, we did not use the basic constituents of one essential meaning structure as a 
model for the other essential meaning structures. Thus, when comparing the three 
structures, we had to rephrase the constituents to describe the same dimensions. Here we 
use Van den Berg’s (1972) delineation of lived experience into lived world, lived others, 




Figure 4: Comparing PPD and NPPD 
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When comparing three different phenomenological meaning structures, it is vital to 
identify and describe what gives the different constituents their meaning. Keeping this 
focus in mind, to dissect and discuss the constituents independently as if they were 
objective and independent symptoms could easily lead to a faulty understanding of the 
phenomenon. It is important to note that a difference in meaning structure is not a 
statistical and formal difference, and should not be treated as such. Van den Berg (1972) 
stressed that the different lived dimensions should be considered as unitary, i.e. as 
different aspects of a whole. A change in our lived emotional body will also mean a 
change in our lived world. Following a phenomenological rationale, we discuss the 
overarching differences that have an impact on all constituents and are considered to be 
the most meaningful.  
 
8.4.1 Similarities  
All the women but one (loss of my-ness) in our three studies experienced profound shame 
and guilt. For the PPD women in the first structure (the looming threatening world) in 
Paper I, shame was mostly experienced when they felt exposed as bad mothers in social 
situations, whereas they had a constant feeling of guilt because they perceived themselves 
unable to provide good enough care for the baby (lived self). When experiencing shame 
they condemned themselves through the perceived critical eyes of the other (lived others). 
The second essential structure (loss of my-ness) in Paper I reveals that if the alienation 
and disconnection are too profound, the woman/mother finds herself incapable of feeling 
any guilt or shame. The NPPD women in Paper III were mostly troubled by a core shame. 
In their descriptions this core shame was verbalized as a deep feeling of being a ‘bad’ or 
‘weak’ person (lived self). Hence, the feelings of shame and guilt in both the PPD 
meaning structure (the looming threatening world) and the NPPD meaning structure 
(engulfed by an alienated and threatening emotional body) imply that both the PPD 
(Structure 1) and NPPD women felt that they were bad or weak people (lived self) and 
that others viewed them critically (lived others). 
 The PPD (Structure 1) women and the NPPD women revealed similarities with 
respect to how they lived time. For both essential meaning structures, negative 
experiences in the past, either trauma or former shame and guilt, form and restrict their 
emotions, thoughts and actions in the present and their anticipations of the future. Hence 
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the traumatic past has a dominant negative position. However, as our case study revealed, 
difficulties in past life re-emerge, not primarily as representational memories, but as a 
manner of being in the world. 
 
8.4.2 How do they differ? 
When comparing PPD (Structure 1) “the looming threatening world” with NPPD 
“engulfed by an alienated and threatening emotional body”, the most striking and 
meaningful difference is that for the PPD women the development of depression starts 
with the troubling experience that their whole world (lived world) is shaken. It is as if the 
very ground underneath their feet has been agitated. Their world has suddenly changed 
and has become more threatening and alienated. They feel more insecure and anxious 
(lived self). The everyday actions which they used to perform naturally and with ease now 
fill them with troubling insecurity and anxiety. The perceived threat from the world is 
experienced as directed towards their baby, and they question their own ability protect it. 
 The essence of NPPD reveals a rather different and more gradual onset of 
depression. The women experience themselves as trapped in a personal mission in which 
they overwork or over-involve themselves. They are highly sensitive to others’ distress 
(lived others) and restricted by feelings of guilt and shame (lived self) from the past, 
which make them neglect and ignore their own needs. They describe depression as a 
gradually developing relational disturbance.  
PPD is experienced at a basic existential level; from the onset of the depression 
the women’s whole lived world has an alien and threatening atmosphere. Svenaeus (1999) 
refers to this as the feeling of uncanniness, of not feeling at home in the world. We can 
describe this difference between PPD and NPPD as a difference in their experienced 
nearness or distance to the world. The PPD women felt from the start in essence 
disconnected from the baby and the world, whereas NPPD women described themselves 
as being essentially infiltrated with others and the world. This is exemplified in the PPD 
women’s experience of the troubling feeling of detachment from their baby compared to 
the NPPD women’s experience of being wide open to the negative feelings of others and 
to some degree feeling others’ emotions as their own. However, the fact that the NPPD 
women experienced themselves as almost infected by others’ thoughts and emotions does 
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not necessarily imply that these feelings and thoughts belonged to the other. Our analysis 
revealed that the women had a tendency to interpret others’ emotions on the basis of their 
past negative experiences. Thus, the experiences of being infiltrated with others’ emotions 
or feeling disconnected from them do not necessarily equate to differences in attunement 
to the world. 
Parallel to the difference in their lived world, there is a meaningful difference in 
how the PPD (Structure 1) and the NPPD women in our study describe their lived body. 
Here it is important to note that the lived body is not limited to the body as the object for 
consciousness, but refers to the emotional body as a means by which we relate to the 
world, “rather than a perception of the one in isolation from the other” (Ratcliffe, 2008). 
Whereas the PPD women experience their emotional bodies as an obstacle, limiting them 
in caring for and attuning to the baby, the NPPD women describe that they actively ignore 
and subsequently become increasingly alienated from their emotional bodies. The act of 
ignoring their own needs has detrimental effects over time; eventually the NPPD women 
reach a point where they become engulfed by their distressed embodied emotions; 
subsequently they too experience themselves essentially disconnected from others and the 
world.  
 The essential meaning structure “loss of primordial my-ness” (Structure 2, PPD) is 
similar to “the looming threatening world” (Structure 1, PPD) in the sense that both can 
be described as a disconnection from others (lived others) and the world (lived world). 
However, “loss of primordial my-ness” is experienced as a much more fundamental 
disconnection and includes the distinct experience of de-personalization that is not 
described in “the looming threatening world”. In this essential meaning structure the 
mother experiences a loss of ownership of her own perceptions, emotions, thoughts and 
actions in a most basic way. This basic disturbance of self has been described as a 
disturbance in lived time which involves a loss of the dynamic integration of past, present 
and future (Tellenbach, 1961/1980). On the other hand, in both “the looming threatening 
world” and “engulfed by an alienated and threatening body” the dynamic integration of 
past, present and future is not lost. However, it may be disturbed in the sense that the past 




8.4.3 How can we understand these differences?  
8.4.3.1  Differences: Theoretical perspectives 
How then, can we understand the difference between PPD and NPPD? In the next section 
we will discuss these differences in terms of the understandings of depression from the 
various prevailing perspectives pertinent to our findings. Of all the different perspectives 
presented in Chapter 2, we will limit the discussion of our findings to the following 
theories that, we feel, can illuminate differences between the three essential meaning 




Evolutionary perspectives on depression, not limited to PPD, stress that entrapment, 
excessive interpersonal sensitivity, and neuroticism are highly associated with depression 
and anxiety (Gilbert, Gilbert, & Irons, 2004; Gilbert, 2006). From an evolutionary 
perspective, interpersonal sensitivity is essential for understanding as well as predicting 
others’ behavior and thereby ensuring the survival and well-being of offspring. Also, a 
high degree of neuroticism may motivate the individual to engage in intensive work to 
avoid negative results, which in non-resolvable situations may lead to exhaustion and 
depression. Interpersonal sensitivity and neuroticism in moderate levels may be adaptive, 
but these personality traits may also have unfortunate side-effects, such as being overly 
sensitive to and preoccupied by others and self-critical thinking (Gilbert et al., 2004; 
Gilbert, 2006). The NPPD women in our study felt entrapped in a negative situation over 
a prolonged period of time and described a combination of excessive interpersonal 
sensitivity and self-critical thinking, which they tried to resolve by overworking or over-
involvement. Hence, our findings indicate that the essential structure in NPPD fits in well 
with the general evolutionary theory of depression and anxiety, but how does this theory 
account for PPD? 
One could hypothesize that the mothers in our study initially were highly sensitive 
to the baby’s distress and needs, and that this sensitivity made them especially vulnerable 
to stressful life events in the postpartum period which led to depression (Oldehinkel & 
Bouma, 2011). But the mothers in our study did not describe stressful life events in the 
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postpartum period, that is, besides giving birth and their experienced depression. Neither 
did they describe an increased sensitivity to the baby. Rather, they experienced a sense of 
disconnection from the baby and the world. It is conceivable, however, that the mothers’ 
increased sensitivity around the birth and in the postpartum period made them more 
vulnerable to their traumatic memories of stressful life events in the past. This in turn may 
have disconnected them from the present and their baby. How the past can become re-
actualized in the present and the anticipated future was explored in our case study.  
 Another hypothesis within social evolutionary perspectives is that the mothers’ 
own attachment strategies which may have been adaptive to their own dysfunctional 
parent may be less adaptive later in life, leaving the individual more vulnerable to 
depression (Ainsworth, 1991; Fonagy, 1999; Gilbert, 2006). Also, an increased degree of 
metacognition is hypothesized to have maladaptive side-effects, such as a high degree of 
self-reproach and ruminations (Allen & Badcock, 2006; Gilbert, 2006). According to this 
hypothesis women who have an increased metacognitive ability may have an increased 
risk of depression both postpartum and non-postpartum. Thus, this line of reasoning does 
not account satisfactorily for the difference between PPD and NPPD. One evolutionary 
theory that proposes an explanation for the feeling of disconnection in depressed mothers 
has been put forth by Hagen (1999). According to this theory the feeling of disconnection 
is equal to a reduction in the mother’s investment in the offspring when the costs of 
caring for the child outweigh the benefits. PPD functions as a motivator both to take 
action to reduce the pain and also to seek social support. However, the PPD women in our 
study were very ambivalent to seeking the support of others and had a strong tendency to 
conceal their feelings from others. Thus, although Hagen’s theory may account for certain 
important aspects of the PPD women’s experiences, other aspects would seem to 
contradict it. 
 Stern’s (1995) mother-child interaction theory and his description of important 
themes involved in the motherhood constellation may explain why women in the 
postpartum period may experience depression differently. (Although Stern here is placed 
within the social evolutionary perspective, it should be noted that Stern’s theory also is 
influenced by other perspectives.) Stern proposes that women at a certain time during 
pregnancy and in the postpartum period enter the motherhood constellation, which 
encompasses four essential themes: 1) the life-growth theme, which concerns the 
mother’s ability to maintain the life and growth of the baby; 2) the primary relatedness 
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theme, which refers to the mother’s ability emotionally to engage with the baby in an 
authentic manner, and assure the baby’s psychic development; 3) the identity 
reorganization theme, which concerns her ability to transform her self-identity, and 4) the 
supporting matrix theme, regarding her ability to create and permit the necessary support 
systems. The mothers in our study felt the world to be full of potential dangers for their 
baby and they questioned their ability to protect it from these dangers. Hence, the life-
growth theme is of primary importance in the essential meaning structure of PPD. The 
second theme, primary relatedness, is also prominent for the mothers in our study, where 
they to various degrees feel unable to authentically attune to their baby. Rather, they felt 
desynchronized from it. The third theme, identity reorganization, was present in the 
mothers’ highly self-critical thinking regarding their own capabilities as mothers. Some of 
the women also had problems in feeling like mothers, and reported feeling more like an 
aunt to the baby. They thus reported some difficulty in transforming their self-identity to 
include motherhood. The fourth theme was also present; they felt reluctant to ask others 
for practical support. Stern notes that the motherhood constellation involves an openness 
to unconscious representations and processes that at other times are often ignored. Stern’s 
theory of the motherhood constellation may provide an understanding of why the 
consciousness of the PPD mothers in our study is centered on the baby and why they 
experience the world as essentially more dangerous than the NPPD mothers. But we 
found that it does not fully account for why the PPD mothers experience a sense of 
disconnection, whereas the NPPD women feel essentially infiltrated with others’ feelings 
and thoughts, and neither does it account for the existential aspects of PPD.  
 
Psychoanalytic perspectives 
The depressed mothers’ strong tendency to be overly concerned with the baby’s safety 
can from within a psychoanalytic perspective be interpreted as a defense mechanism: If 
aggressive impulses towards the baby are anxiety provoking, the ego tries to undo or 
conceal (reaction formation) these thoughts by excessively worrying about the baby’s 
safety or by the mother pulling herself together to do the practical care for the baby (Blatt 
& Luyten, 2009b; Luyten et al., 2007). Thus, even though the mothers in our study did 
not report anger issues in relation to the baby, they could be seen to undo, conceal or 
repress their anger. They did tend to rationalize their perceived lack of attachment and 
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tried to convince themselves that their practical care for the baby and their anxiety for its 
safety proved their love. Blatt and Luyten (Luyten et al., 2007; Blatt & Luyten, 2009b) 
propose that the above defense mechanisms are associated with the psychodynamic 
theory of the introjective (self-critical) personality type which is preoccupied with 
accomplishment and has rigid and often unrealistic standards. Blatt’s introjective 
personality type is hypothesized to be concerned with defending and protecting a viable 
sense of self and employs counteractive strategies, such as projection, rationalization, 
intellectualization, doing and undoing, reaction formation and overcompensation (Blatt et 
al., 1995). Several studies have found self-criticism to be associated with PPD (Besser, 
Vliegen, Luyten, & Blatt, 2008; Priel & Besser, 1999).  
The interpersonal sensitivity that we found in NPPD women fits in well with 
elements of Blatt’s (1974; 1990) psychodynamic ideas of the anaclitic (dependent) as well 
as introjective (self-critical) personality types. All the depressed women in our NPPD 
study were in some way or another sensitive to and preoccupied with others’ emotions or 
judgments. They often avoided confrontations, strove to seek others’ approval, and felt 
ambivalent and anxious the few times they tried to assert their own autonomy. However, 
in this process they were also highly self-critical and self-punitive. They tended to repress 
their own feelings and reactions and engage in an excessive effort to live up to both their 
own expectations (self-perfection) and others’ expectations (social perfection). These 
findings indicate that both dependent and self-critical dimensions were interacting in 
NPPD, which is congruent with Kagan’s (2003) study where she found that self-critical 
and dependent dimensions often occur together and may be best understood as different 
expressions of the same fear of abandonment and rejection. Thus, vulnerability to PPD 
and NPPD may depend on whether the woman has a self-critical or dependent self-
organization: Self-critical women are more vulnerable to PPD, whereas both self-critical 
and dependent women may be vulnerable to NPPD.  
 
Feminist perspectives 
Feminist perspectives on PPD and NPPD characteristically stress that unrealistic gender 
role expectations may lead women into depression (e.g. Jack, 1991; Jack & Ali, 2010; 
Mauthner, 1998; 1999; Nicolson, 1990; 1999). After giving birth, many Norwegian 
mothers find themselves suddenly confined to their home alone with their baby. After two 
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weeks most fathers go back to work, leaving the new mothers alone with the baby for 
many hours a day for 8-11 months. Thus, most mothers experience a radical shift from 
being out in the social world with other adults, involved in projects, etc, to being more or 
less isolated with a totally dependent baby. Many previous qualitative studies have 
interpreted the mother’s depression as a form of loss; loss of former social life, working 
life and sexuality (Beck, 1992; 1996; Mason, Rice, & Records, 2005; Wood, Thomas, 
Droppleman, & Meighan, 1997). Although the mothers in our study did not directly 
describe the transition to motherhood as a loss, we may hypothesize that a sense of loss 
may have exacerbated the feeling of disconnection.  
We find that the qualitative differences between PPD and NPPD cannot be fully 
understood solely in terms of the general cultural role transition and stress involved when 
giving birth to, and rearing, a child. One of the mothers in our study only became 
depressed after giving birth to her second child. For her, it was not the role transition, nor 
the stress connected to birth or childrearing, that induced her depression. Rather, it was 
what the birth of the baby girl meant to her; what engulfed her was how she perceived the 
girl’s future based on her own incest experiences in the past. Thus, neither cultural gender 
expectations nor objective measures of risk factors for PPD can ever truly predict or 
capture what such circumstances/events mean for the mother, which in turn will 
determine how these so-called risk factors affect them.  
 
Phenomenological perspectives 
From within phenomenological perspectives, the differences between the three general 
meaning structures may be best understood as different ways of being in the world, that 
is, as different existential feelings. Ratcliffe (2008) describes existential feelings as 
central to the structure of all experience; they may or may not be constituents of, or 
accompanied by, standard emotions. He explains that “feelings more generally are not 
simply of the body or the world, but involve a relationship between the two in which one, 
the other, or neither might occupy the existential foreground” (p. 36). In PPD, the 
existential feeling of the threatening world (the world dimension) is in the foreground, 
whereas in NPPD it is rather the negative or critical other (the social dimension) that is in 
focus. Thus, there is a difference in the        figure-ground Gestalt, where PPD is more 
existentially oriented whereas NPPD is more relationally oriented.  
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The depressed women in our study experienced either a sudden (PPD) or a gradual 
(NPPD) change in their relations between self and world. The PPD women experienced 
themselves as suddenly more disconnected to the world (and baby), whereas the NPPD 
women increasingly experienced themselves as infiltrated with others’ negative emotions. 
But this experienced infiltration with others’ emotions in NPPD women does not 
necessarily imply an increased attunement to the other. In our analysis we found that 
NPPD, but also PPD (Structure 1), women tended to relive their own past through the 
perceived emotions of others. The other triggered emotions connected to their own past, 
but which were perceived as belonging to the other and not to one’s self. Thus, the 
different existential feelings of disconnection and infiltration do not necessarily 
correspond to a difference in attunement to the world and others. Ratcliffe (2008) 
proposes that pathological existential feelings typically involve a partial or complete loss 
of openness to interpersonal possibilities. This lack of openness may involve experiencing 
the world as threatening (“the looming threatening world”), other people as critical and 
condemning (“engulfed by others’ negative emotions”), or one might experience an 
almost total loss of openness (“loss of my-ness”). 
 
8.4.3.2  The special quality of mood in “Loss of my-ness” 
Here we discuss the special quality of PPD Structure 2, “loss of my-ness”. In our view, 
the different evolutionary, psychoanalytic and feministic perspectives do not sufficiently 
account for the extreme feeling of depersonalization described in this essential meaning 
structure, thus these perspectives will not be discussed here.  
From the phenomenological perspective the extreme feeling of alienation and 
depersonalization involved in “loss of my-ness” has been described as a core dimension 
in melancholia, a severe form of depression which is qualitatively different from other 
types of depression. Kraus (2004; 2008) describes how melancholia involves a holistic 
alteration of the person’s relationship to himself, others, and the world. It transforms all 
his psychic acts. Kraus further points out that the melancholic patient is not only 
cheerless, not only anhedonic, but that he experiences an immobility of emotion. 
Moreover, he describes this fixation of emotion as inexplicable, unmotivated and 
rendering the patient incapable of working through his mourning. Fuchs (2008) argues 
that the experience of depersonalization and derealization involved in melancholia is a 
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result of loss of bodily resonance. He uses Merleau-Ponty’s (1945/1962) distinction 
between the lived and corporeal body, where the former comprises all our pre-reflective 
experiences mediated through our body, and the latter refers to the anatomical object of 
physiology and medicine. Merleau-Ponty describes how we can experience the corporeal 
body, especially in illness and shame, where our body ceases to be an invisible medium 
and becomes an object for our perception, a difficult tool to be handled. Fuchs (2008) 
describes melancholia as the corporealization of the lived body, as bodily restriction, 
which in its extreme forms inhibits feelings of sadness, guilt or remorse. This 
corporealization implies a loss of attunement or emotional resonance to an extent where 
the person no longer “is capable to be moved, addressed and affected by things or 
persons” (p. 75). In the most severe forms of depression the ability to sense feelings and 
atmospheres is almost totally lost, leaving only pain and anxiety.  
 
8.4.4 A comparison of qualitative and quantitative findings 
We cannot infer from our findings whether PPD women experience more symptoms of 
anxiety or depression than NPPD women. Those are quantitative research questions that 
require quantitative research. Our findings imply that the women’s experience of PPD and 
NPPD in our study encompassed both anxiety and depression, but that these were lived in 
essentially different ways.  However, such essential differences were not found in our 
quantitative review.  
 The lack of consistent differences between PPD and NPPD found in studies 
applying a quantitative design may be due to methodological differences between the 
studies included in the review, but it is also timely to question the ability of the various 
quantitative studies to identify symptoms of anxiety. For example, the distinctions 
between the anxiety in “the looming threatening world” in PPD, the anxiety related to 
interpersonal sensitivity and the experience of being “engulfed by an alienated and 
threatening emotional body” in NPPD represent a difference in meaning not easily 
accounted for by anxiety rating scales or by just adding on 2 to 4 general anxiety 
symptoms listed in DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) or ICD-10 (WHO, 2004). 
In our opinion, the symptoms of depression listed in DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) 
and ICD-10 (WHO, 2004) may be too unspecific to enable identification of the 
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differences that we described between the essential meaning structures, especially 
between PPD Structure 2 compared to PPD Structure 1 and NPPD.  
Some psychiatrists and clinical psychologist may consider the second structure 
identified in the PPD sample to reflect melancholia. Kraus (1994) claims that even though 
there is prevailing agreement among practicing psychiatrists concerning the special 
quality of mood involved in melancholia, this difference is now ignored by many 
clinicians and poorly identified by current diagnostic criteria . Today, in the DSM-IV-TR 
and ICD-10 classification systems, the diagnosis MDD with melancholic features 
specifier (DSM-IV-TR) or somatic syndrome (ICD-10) is arrived at by adding so-called 
melancholic/somatic features (e.g. loss of interest, anhedonia, diurnal variation) to the 
mood symptoms. Thus, the alteration of mood in MDD is not necessarily considered as 
different when the melancholic features specifier (DSM-IV-TR) or somatic syndrome 
(ICD-10) is added. Although DSM-IV-TR does include one symptom which describes the 
distinct quality of depressed mood in melancholia as different from mourning, it is not 
well defined and does not need to be present in order to satisfy the criteria for the 
melancholic features specifier. Kraus points out that the diagnostic systems separate 
disturbances of functions that should not be separated because the type of 
depersonalization involved in melancholic depression alters the whole meaning of the 
interrelated symptoms. Such separation of symptoms or disturbances of functions may 
lead to an ignorance of the essential aspect of melancholia which we have described as 
“the loss of my-ness”. This essential mood quality is not captured by the added somatic 
symptoms which subsequently do not successfully distinguish between melancholia and 
“simple” depression. 
 
8.5.0 Additional comments 
The ability to understand others’ affective states, to empathize, is essential for our 
relationships (Minkowski, 1933/1970; Scheler, 1912/1970). In PPD the problem resides 
in the feeling of alienation and disconnection in relation to the world and the baby, 
whereas in NPPD the problem is rather an experienced heightened sensitivity to others’ 
distress or negative judgments. Thus, there is a difference in the development of PPD and 
NPPD which seems to be centered around two opposites, namely experienced 
disconnection versus heightened sensitivity in relation to the world and the other. This 
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difference is, however, not necessarily accompanied by a difference in attunement to the 
world and the other (baby). The experienced disconnection and alienation in PPD can be 
conceptualized as existential depression and anxiety as they revolve around the basic 
feeling of being in the world, whereas the increased sensitivity can be conceptualized as a 
more relational depression and anxiety which revolves around interpersonal relations (I-
Thou). Hence, the differences between the essential meaning structures pivot around 
different ways of finding oneself in the world. These are thus different existential facets 
of being-in-the-world, which involve different existential feelings that constrain the 
structure of all one’s experience (Ratcliffe, 2008).  
  Within a phenomenological perspective, meaning is the most critical aspect of 
psychiatric disorders. DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) rests on the biomedical model and 
includes assumptions about what is normal as opposed to abnormal, and that this 
distinction can be estimated, assessed and observed through a set of observable symptoms 
(Giorgi, 2005). Thus, symptoms are often understood and treated as objective facts and 
any information about what it actually means for the person to develop and have these 
symptoms is ignored. What is measured is the set of symptoms, their intensity, and their 
frequency of occurrence or duration. Barbro Giorgi (2005) claims that when we reach our 
breaking point, we can assume that we will no longer function optimally and that we will 
exhibit a number of symptoms. However, she also argues that the nature of these 
symptoms is not as important as what in the person’s life contributed to reaching the 
breaking point. Giorgi proposes that we should not treat the symptoms as the problem that 
needs to be resolved, but rather see them as carrying information about what is troubling 
the person, as pointing to the client’s lived meaning.  
 In our opinion, the essential meaning structures of a phenomenon include 
information about both the relevant past and the present, because the past is always 
implicitly present. Knowledge of how the past constrains the possibilities for thinking, 
feeling and acting in the present is vital in order to identify, understand and treat the 
disorder. However, we agree with Giorgi that we need to go beyond the overgeneralized 
and insufficiently specific symptoms listed in DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) and ICD-10 







9.1 Psychotherapeutic implications 
The phenomenological perspective helps us to reorient our focus from considering 
symptoms as the main problem to be resolved towards exploring, describing and 
understanding how depressed women exist in their world. Thus a fundamental goal of 




From a phenomenological perspective it is of vital importance to understand and validate 
how our patients exist in their world. We found that PPD can be described first and 
foremost as an existential crisis which is lived as the looming alienated and threatening 
world. The women suffered an existential depression which can be understood as a form 
of sudden desynchronization. On the basis of our findings, psychotherapy should assist 
the patient in the process of resynchronization. Different therapies which focus directly on 
the mother-baby relation and on attachment, such as the Circle of Security intervention 
(Powell, Cooper, Hoffman, & Marvin, 2009) and the Marte Meo method (Vik & Bråten, 
2009), may be  effective in promoting increased attachment. Other activities to enhance 
the mother’s attunement to the baby such as increased emotional and physical contact 
through e.g. imitation games or baby massage could form part of the therapeutic process. 
Previous studies have shown the importance of paternal support in the treatment of PPD, 
which indicates the potential benefits of triad oriented therapy including the mother, baby, 
and partner (Misri, Kostaras, Fox, & Kostaras, 2000; Montgomery, Baily, Purdon, 
Snelling, & Kauppi, 2009). Also, planned activities involving social contact with others, 
especially other mothers, can help restore synchronicity to the social world. The 
experienced guilt and shame underscore the need for a therapeutic atmosphere of 
openness, trust and assurance of confidentiality.  
Our findings harmonize with Stern’s (1995) description of the essential themes in 
the motherhood constellation. According to Stern, psychotherapy for new mothers needs 
to take into account the special type of self-organization involved in the motherhood 
constellation. He stresses that depressed mothers primarily need a holding environment 
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provided by experienced maternal figures in order to successfully solve the different 
essential issues involved.  
Our case study, however, revealed how important the traumatic past can be for the 
development of PPD and it might be possible to prevent this type of depression by 
identifying and alleviating the traumatic experiences of some women before the birth. 
One might gradually and tactfully help her to perceive and acknowledge her self-
restricting patterns of being in the world and subsequently introduce the unfolding 
possibilities of existence (Mook, 1985). We hypothesized that mothers suffering from a 
loss of primordial my-ness (PPD, Structure 2) might also benefit from pharmacological 
treatment directed towards restoring synchronization of fundamental biorhythms. 
Considering their unbearable anxiety and internal pain they are at high risk for 
committing suicide, underscoring the need to assess possible suicidal ideation and plans.  
 
NPPD   
Our findings indicate that the NPPD women’s depression is caused by a combination of 
feeling entrapped, sensitivity to others’ negative emotions, feelings of guilt and shame, 
excessive feelings of responsibility and overworking and ignoring their own emotional 
body.  
The depressed women’s feelings of guilt and shame were described as the 
motivating factor for their engagement in self-destructive activities, such as overworking 
to the extent that they became overwhelmed and exhausted. Thus treatment should aim at 
reducing these excessive feelings of responsibility, shame and guilt. Emotion focused 
therapy (Greenberg & Watson, 2006) might help to elaborate on, differentiate and change 
the underlying feeling of weak or bad self and thus reduce the excessive feelings of guilt 
and shame. Treatment which increases the depressed women’s attention to their 
emotional body, such as mindfulness oriented therapy (Fjordback, Arendt, Ørnbøl, Fink, 
& Walach, 2011; Michalak, Burg, & Heidenreich, 2012), and encourages them to act on 





9.2 Research implications 
On the basis of our findings on PPD, future phenomenological research could investigate 
whether other major transformations or existential crises would give a similar essential 
meaning structure to “the looming threatening and alienated world” or whether it would 
be essentially different. Also, it would be interesting to investigate the essential meaning 
structure in men’s experience of PPD and compare it with our findings on PPD in women.  
Another interesting line of research would be to further explore the essential 
meaning structures of how anxiety and depression interact in both in PPD and NPPD 
from within the descriptive phenomenological perspective.  
The phenomenological aspects discussed in the separate articles might inform and 
generate hypotheses for future larger-scale research. For example, one could investigate 
how frequently women with a history of child sexual abuse develop PPD after birth and 
whether the sex of the baby is an associated risk factor. Knowing the scale of the problem 
would provide important information when considering implementation of screening for 
CSA and other childhood trauma in pregnant women. Another line of research suggested 
by our findings would be to study differences in the quality of anxiety experienced by 
patients suffering from different types of depression compared to those suffering from 







The aim of this thesis was to describe and compare the phenomena of PPD and NPPD 
from within a phenomenological perspective. We have identified two different essential 
meaning structures of PPD. PPD may be experienced by the mother as suddenly finding 
herself in a threatening and alienated world, concomitant with a strong feeling of anxiety 
and insecurity. We termed this way of experiencing PPD ‘the looming threatening world’. 
Alternatively PPD may be experienced as a fundamental depersonalization and 
derealization where the mother no longer feels ownership of her perceptions, thoughts and 
actions. We named this way of experiencing PPD ‘loss of my-ness’. NPPD, on the other 
hand, may be experienced as feeling entrapped in a personal mission in which the woman 
overworks or over-involves herself. Crumbling under the perceived disapproval of others, 
she doubts her own judgments and she experiences the negative emotions of others almost 
as if these were her own. Excessive feelings of responsibility are coupled with strong 
feelings of shame and guilt. In the process she ignores her increasingly alienated and 
frightening embodied emotions in which she is ultimately submerged. We referred to this 
experience of NPPD as ‘Engulfed by an alienated and threatening emotional body’. 
 PPD mothers felt in essence disconnected and alienated from the world and others 
(including the baby), whereas in NPPD the problem was rather that the women 
experienced heightened sensitivity to others’ distress or negative judgments. This 
difference in the development of PPD and NPPD seems to represent two opposites in 
relation to the world and others, namely experienced disconnection versus heightened 
sensitivity. We conceptualized the former as existential depression, and the latter as a 
relational type of depression. These findings have potential psychotherapeutic 
implications. In order to strengthen and validate our findings, these results should be 
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A case study of a mother’s intertwining experiences with incest and
postpartum depression
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Abstract
The association between childhood sexual abuse (CSA) and major depression disorder (MDD) gives reason to suspect that
many mothers with postpartum depression (PPD) have a history of CSA. However, few studies have investigated how CSA
and PPD are related. In this case study we explore how the experience of incest intertwines with the experience of
postpartum depression. We focus on participant subject ‘‘Nina,’’ who has experienced both. We interviewed her three times
and we analysed the interviews with Giorgi’s phenomenological descriptive method to arrive at a contextualised meaning
structure. Nina’s intruding fantasies of men who abuse her children merge with her recollections of her own incest
experiences. She may succeed in forcing these fantasies out of her consciousness, but they still alter her perceptions,
thoughts, and emotions. She feels overwhelmed and succumbs to sadness, while she also is drawn towards information
about CSA, which in turn feeds her fantasies. The psychodynamic concepts of repetition compulsion, transference, and
projection may provide some explanation of Nina’s actions, thoughts, and emotions through her past experiences. With our
phenomenological stance, we aim to acknowledge Nina’s descriptions of her everyday life here and now. With reference to
Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Minkowski, we show that Nina’s past is not a dated memory; rather it determines
the structure of her consciousness that constitutes her past as her true present and future. Incest dominates Nina’s world,
and her possibilities for action are restricted by this perceived world. Any suspension of action implies anguish, and she
resolves this by incest-structured action that in turn feeds and colours her expectations. Thus anxiety and depression are
intertwined in the structure of this experience.
Key words: Child sexual abuse, incest, postpartum depression, descriptive phenomenology, case study
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Psychological trauma from childhood may haunt a
person in her everyday experience of both herself
and others and restrict her possible thoughts,
actions, and feelings. Pregnancy and birth may elicit
memories of abuse and contribute to the develop-
ment of postpartum depression (Buist & Janson,
2001; Mason, Rice, & Records, 2005). The pre-
valence of childhood sexual abuse (CSA) in women
has been estimated at between 8.2 and 30.4%,
largely dependent on the definition of CSA, the
measurement, and population studied (Anderson,
Martin, Mullen, & Romans, 1993; Finkelhor &
Dziuba-Leatherman, 1994; Heimstad, Dahloe,
Laache, Skogvoll, & Schei, 2006; Sariola & Uutela,
1994). Narrowly defined sexual abuse (contact
abuse) has a prevalence of about 5.6% and a yearly
incidence of 3.2% (Finkelhor & Dziuba-Leather-
man, 1994). Childhood abuse and neglect have been
associated with increased risk for major depression
disorder (MDD) (Widom, DuMont, & Czaja,
2007). An estimated 5% of all new mothers experi-
ence MDD and many of these remain undetected
and untreated (Gavin et al., 2005; Glavin, Smith, &
Sorum, 2009). Also, studies have shown an increa-
sed incidence of depression during the first 5 months
postpartum (Eberhard-Gran, Tambs, Opjordsmoen,
Skrondal, & Eskild 2003; Gavin et al., 2005;
Munk-Olsen et al., 2009). Subsequently, it is not
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unreasonable to assume that there are many post-
partum depressed mothers with a history of CSA.
A few studies have investigated how CSA might
affect the experience of birth and motherhood
(Cohen, 1995; Eberhard-Gran, Slinning, & Eskild,
2008; Heimstad et al., 2006; Mason et al., 2005;
Parratt, 1994). Childhood sexual abuse is associated
with fear of childbirth and increased risk of compli-
cations during delivery (Eberhard-Gran et al., 2008;
Heimstad et al., 2006; Leeners, Richter-Appelt,
Imthurn, & Rath, 2006). Parratt (1994) found that
experiences concerning privacy, touch, and control
during childbirth were potent links to memories of
sexual abuse, but found few commonalities between
different cases in how these memories affect child-
birth experiences. Mason et al. (2005) found that
childbirth contributed to the recall of abuse where
the women engaged in a cognitive frame of reference
similar to abuse; they felt easily victimised and out of
control. However, they concluded that the mothers’
experience of PPD was similar to that of women not
exposed to CSA.
Childhood sexual abuse victims are likely to
experience parenting difficulties. Cohen (1995)
compared 26 incestually abused mothers with a
control group. The results indicated that the sexually
abused mothers were less skilful in maternal func-
tioning than the control group. Survivors of incest
had an increased tendency to have rigid role
expectations, to be non-cooperative, and to be less
able to share responsibilities with their partner.
There was a clear tendency for these mothers to
have a negative view of their own competence and to
feel they were a failure, overwhelmed, exhausted,
inadequate, and guilty. In addition, they found that
survivors of incest had a reduced ability to commu-
nicate freely and openly with others. Douglass
(2000) found that women with a CSA history
more often report distress in intimate child care
because they associate it with their abuse. Other
researchers found that abused parents have reported
being more overprotective, have a more intrusive
and impulsive parenting style, to have low self-
esteem and ambivalence about parenting, difficulty
setting limits, and feeling resentments towards their
children (DiLillo & Damashek, 2003; Mo¨hler,
Biringen, & Poustka, 2007; Mo¨hler et al., 2009).
In addition psychological disturbances, especially
MDD, posttraumatic stress disorder, and general-
ised anxiety disorder are found to mediate the
relationship between CSA and parenting difficulties
(Schuetze & Eiden, 2004).
These studies give important clues about how
motherhood may affect survivors of incest. However,
there is little research describing how a history of
incest intertwines with the experience of PPD. This
article is a preliminary attempt to fill that void by
using a descriptive phenomenological approach
(Giorgi, 2009).
Method
We report on a single case to make possible an in-
depth analysis of the complex meaning patterns of
incest and PPD intertwined. The participant was
involved in a larger phenomenological study on the
general meaning structure of PPD (Røseth, Binder
& Malt, accepted for publication). Only she related
PPD to incest, and her rich descriptions called for,
and made possible, a separate case study analysis
enabling a comprehensive understanding of the
phenomenon.
The study is anchored in a phenomenological
philosophy that originated with Husserl (1962). This
philosophy was developed further by, amongst
others, Merleau-Ponty (1962) and made accessible
to psychology as a scientific research method by
Giorgi (2009). Husserl articulated the insight that
consciousness is intentional; it is always directed
towards an immanent object (e.g., memories, fanta-
sies, or hallucinations) or a transcendent object (an
object in the physical world). He pointed out that all
phenomena are a product of both the intentional act
and the intended object, thus phenomena are in
essence relational and context dependent.
The phenomenological method requires that the
researcher suspends, or ‘‘brackets,’’ theoretical, and
practical preconceptions and assumptions about the
phenomenon that is the object of study (Husserl,
1962; Merleau-Ponty, 1962). Another important
methodological process is to withhold an existential
claim, meaning that the researcher suspends belief in
the existence or ‘‘reality’’ of the phenomenon under
investigation (Giorgi, 2009; Husserl, 1962). To
bracket and withhold the existential claim helps the
researcher to keep an open mind and to see the
phenomenon in a fresh light and thus let it ‘‘speak
for itself.’’ However, this does not mean that it is
possible to become totally free from preconceptions
and prejudices due to prior knowledge. A basic
pre-understanding of the phenomena under inves-
tigation is also a premise for understanding it
(Heidegger, 1962). In this context, bracketing
simply means an attitude towards the experience of
the participant in which the researcher disciplines
herself not to actively add her own preconceptions
and theories.
A phenomenological research interview does not
correspond to any usual type of conversation, it is a
special inter-subjective situation aimed at exploring
the participant’s lifeworld. Both the researcher and
the participant are motivated to fulfil this aim. A
I. Røseth et al.
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good interview depends on the interviewer’s ability
to make the participant feel safe and comfortable,
thus enabling her to reveal sensitive and some-
times painful information about herself (Kvale &
Brinkmann, 2009).
For this case study we have used Giorgi’s descrip-
tive phenomenological method. This method usually
involves at least three subjects; several persons share
their view on and experiences with one and the same
phenomenon. However, in this study we describe
and discuss the phenomenon through one women’s
experience of living and reliving her incest as part of
her PPD. We refer to her as Nina. Nina was
interviewed three times, with each interview lasting
from 45 min to 1.5 h. She initially felt insecure in the
interview setting and needed assurance of our
independence from the public health care system.
It was important that the interview was conducted in
a relaxed atmosphere in her home and that we spent
some time to ‘‘attune’’ to each other before the
digital recorder was turned on. The resulting de-
scriptions were rich in meaning and well suited for a
case study.
We analysed the interviews with Nina in four
logical steps (Giorgi, 2009). The first step was to
read the entire transcript of each interview several
times to get a sense of the whole. Secondly, for each
interview we divided the transcript into meaning
units by being sensitive to and marking shifts in the
psychological meaning of what was said. In the third
step, we transformed the meaning units into a
psychological language, where we identified the
more general character by imaginative variation.
During imaginative variation, the researcher probes
her descriptions by trying out different formulations
and thereby teasing out invariant meanings. Here the
researcher also reads between the lines, teasing out
the coherence between explicit meanings and mean-
ings lying implicit in the descriptions. For the fourth
and final step, we synthesised the transformed
meaning units of all three interviews into a con-
textualised meaning structure. We did not, however,
proceed through these steps in a strictly linear
fashion; the analysis was a dynamic process where
we moved back and forth between steps, especially
steps three and four, until the final contextual
meaning structure was described.
The participant received information about the
study both verbally and in writing. She was
assured confidentiality and any information in her
description that might reveal her identity has been
changed or removed. The participant gave her
informed consent both verbally and in writing to
take part in the research project. She was informed
of her right to withdraw from the study at any
chosen time without stating a reason. The Norwe-
gian Regional Committee for Medical Research
Ethics had approved the study beforehand (nr:
S-08247a).
Findings
Nina is a second time mother, married and in her
mid-20s. She was subjected to childhood sexual and
physical abuse by her father. When she disclosed the
abuse to her mother, her mother chose to support
her father and stay with him. As a consequence Nina
felt it impossible to live with her family and moved to
a foster home. Since she left her family she has had
no contact with her father, and for many years she
did not talk to her mother. She has difficulties
trusting and opening up to others with details about
her past*this includes close friends and lovers. Over
the years she has managed to keep her memories and
the accompanying feelings at a distance by having
many superficial relationships and by working a
great deal, leaving little time to think about and
reflect on her childhood trauma. But when she
entered the study she was diagnosed with MDD
and posttraumatic stress disorder. Nina found that
her incest experiences suddenly resurfaced after the
birth of her second child, a daughter. Her trauma
invaded dramatically how she existed in her lifeworld
and how she anticipated her future.
Contextualised meaning structure
For Nina, PPD means to be thrown into a world full
of men who abuse children. Before giving birth she
could keep traumatic memories of incest at the
fringe of her daily life consciousness. After giving
birth she is overwhelmed by an anxious vigilance and
intruding fantasies of men who abuse children. Her
fantasies merge with recollections of her incest
experiences. This intertwined Gestalt of memories,
fantasies, and experiences is so painful that she
hardly ever succeeds keeping it out of her conscious-
ness, and as a consequence it has an enormous
impact on her daily life. It alters her perceptions,
thoughts, and emotions, i.e., her mode of existence.
Overwhelmed, Nina succumbs into fatigue and
sadness. Nevertheless the CSA experiences of un-
known people interests and attracts her. She actively
seeks out information about CSA, which in turn
feeds her anxious vigilance and fantasies.
This contextualised meaning structure reveals
three highly interrelated constituents that can be
separated for the sake of analysis: from maintaining
distance to overwhelming closeness, the attraction of
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the world of abuse, and difficulty separating self
from baby.
From maintaining distance to overwhelming closeness
Already during her second pregnancy, Nina worries
about what would happen to the unborn girl and
preferred to have a boy. She explained this worry as
based on the belief that girls are more exposed to
sexual abuse than boys. She does not experience
birth itself as traumatic, but her troubling perception
of the baby girl as vulnerable and easy prey to abuse
increase steadily after birth. The anxiety thus
dominates her perceptions of the world, her
thoughts, and emotions.
So it’s also a big . . . after the birth, that I’ve had a
girl . . . I’m so afraid that . . . although it can
happen to boys too . . . of course. But I’m really
afraid that one day someone will abuse her or do
something to her . . . These are things I just can’t
get out of my head . . . Sometimes it’s fantasies
too, but I try to push them far away, I don’t want
to go into detail, it’s kind of all in my head. I just
don’t want to think about them at all.
The vulnerability and dependence of the baby girl
activated general anxious vigilance and fantasies
concerning the girl’s possible future abuse. Most of
her fantasies are vague and general, more correctly
described as an anxious situation, any situation
where her children are alone with any man. Her
fantasies are so painful that she tries to force them
out of her conscious focus. She described her
increased vigilance and fantasies as closely related
to her own memories of incest, which came to the
forefront again after giving birth.
It’s come more often . . . I haven’t always managed
to force it to go away, so to speak. In the past, it
would sometimes come like a flash into my life
again, and then I’ve just thought that it was
something that happened then . . . it’ll never
happen again. It’s not a part of my life any
more. And then I’ve managed to get rid of it
again. But now I’ve seen how vulnerable children
are . . . and they don’t have a chance against
grown-ups . . . When you see how vulnerable
they are, you feel helpless on their behalf. Because
ultimately there’s nothing I can do . . . I’m afraid
that something will happen to them. [Researcher
asks: the same that happened to you?] Yes, or
worse things. So I notice that I’m really hung up
on it [sexual abuse] . . . it really gets to me . . . I get
so upset about what happened [to me] before, so I
feel afraid that it’s going to happen to my children.
I’m very . . . I’m absolutely terrified that some-
thing will happen to them, that they’ll meet
the wrong kind of people who’ll mess them about
or . . .
Our analysis shows that memories from the past
experience with incest merge with anxiety provoking
fantasies about possible future abuse. This merger is
more difficult to push out of conscious focus than it
was before the childbirth. This future moves in on
Nina mercilessly and she grieves as if the anticipated
abuse has already happened. She is overwhelmed by
the insight that she cannot protect her children
forever. Her daily functioning such as preparing
meals, playing with the children, or socialising with
friends diminishes. She becomes depressed, feeling
powerless, and immobilised; her body is fatigued and
filled with emotions that she cannot control. In
short, when actual and possible abuse merge, anxiety
and depression intertwine.
The attraction of the world of abuse
Nina watches the news or reads about abuse of
children on the Internet and experiences their pain
as if was her own.
I identify with the feelings they [abused others]
have, I know how many of them can feel, and then
I experience the grief that I had . . . Yes, I know the
fear, and feel sorry on their behalf.
The information about the abuse experience of other
people’s children, feeds fantasies about her own
children being abused. To this, she reacts emotion-
ally with strong and sustained feelings of anxiety,
grief, and anger. Moreover, the information on the
Internet fuels her perception of men in general as
sexual abusers, which increases her anxiety. Yet these
strong negative emotional reactions do not prevent
her from seeking this kind of information. On the
contrary, she actively searches for information on
CSA; she conveys that she feels drawn towards it.
[A]nd then I’m really upset about*I don’t know,
after I’ve got really very upset*I let things get at
me so much, what goes on in the world, and so on.
And then I’m stupid enough to sit and read a lot of
stuff on the Internet, about children and so on.
Abuse and violence and things like that. It really
gets into me.
Anxiety provoking and destructive as it may be,
information about CSA attracts her. Moreover,
much of her daily life, especially her relations to
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men next to kin, is coloured by fantasies about abuse
of her children. Nina says:
They are very sick thoughts to think, but they are
about the sexual abuse that I have experienced.
That I don’t trust him [my husband] . . . When he
takes the children in the shower, or reads for them
in bed, then I get very . . . I prefer that my husband
is not in the room when my children are in bed . . .
And this is not just about him, it counts for all
men.
Difficulty separating self from baby
Nina’s vigilance and anxiety concerning the possible
future abuse of her children is closely connected to
her own past experience with CSA. Nina says that
she knows that the incest experience influences her
present depression.
Well, it just makes me go around being afraid of it,
all the time. And it was actually a thought that
stuck in my mind before the birth, when I was
pregnant, that I didn’t want a girl, I feel afraid that
more things can happen to a girl than a boy. And
that’s obviously because it happened to me before;
I had a father who was, you know, not quite all
right.
However, in her descriptions during the interview,
she was not fully able to separate her own suffering
from the potential suffering of her child. The insight
that she professed, did not seem to change her
obsessive worry about her child’s safety. Most of the
time Nina did not concern herself with her own
traumatic past, rather she seemed fully immersed in
the anticipated traumatic future of her children.
Our analysis shows that she did not generally
experience her strong sustained feelings of anxiety,
grief, and anger as related to her own abuse, despite
her rational understanding of this relation. She
experienced her feelings as connected to her chil-
dren’s future abuse. Accompanied by her fantasies
she thus grieved this anticipated abuse. She had clear
aggressive and vengeful fantasies of how she would
hurt the abusive men if she could catch them. The
drama of incest presents itself to her as an ongoing
threat, not as a traumatic part of her past. Thus, her
past trauma approaches her from the future, haunt-
ing her through her own children.
A phenomenological description of Nina’s ‘‘here and
now’’
The birth of her baby girl alters Nina’s everyday life.
Increasingly she finds herself in a world full of
dangerous men who will abuse her children if given
the chance. While struggling to hold her traumatic
memories and images at a distance, she is tormented
by a general anxious anticipation and fantasies
concerning possible sexually abusive situations that
her children may encounter. Nina’s past casts long
shadows forward, especially onto her children’s
future, shadows that have an enormous impact on
her life here and now. How can we understand this?
In phenomenology, the experience of a coherent
self and a continuous world is described as inher-
ently temporal and historical. Husserl’s description
of time perception provides us with an understand-
ing of how Nina’s experience is structured with
regard to time (Van Gelder, 1999). According to
Husserl, a person’s consciousness has a triple
structure: retention, primal impression, and proten-
sion. Retentions are intendings of past events. A
primal impression is what happens now. Protensions
are intendings of future states. Retentions are
not memories; they are direct experiences and not
representations. Likewise protensions are not
images, they do not reveal something absent as
something present but rather anticipations, ‘‘direct-
edness’’ towards future events. This threefold struc-
ture of time perception is the basis for our sense of
continuity, both the continuity of our self and the
world around us.
Heidegger’s (1962) work Being in time provides a
further understanding of the complexity of lived
time. When we anticipate a future event, the future
in some way happens now. It is part of the current
phase of consciousness, even though it is directed
towards an event that may happen in the future.
Moreover, we approach the future on the basis of
our past. Also, the past and the future form the
present; what is now is the way it is because of the
past and the future. Thus, we are in some way
already committed to the future by the present we
perceive. This phenomenological description clari-
fies how Nina’s past informs her anxiety about the
future and how, depressed, she lives and grieves this
future in the present. ‘‘The experience is held
together and derives its coherence and meaning
from the future event to which it refers and for
which it is preparatory’’ (von Eckartsberg, 1972,
p. 167).
Merleau-Ponty (1962), with his description of the
object-horizon structure of our consciousness, clari-
fies further how events from the past can lie in the
horizon of our consciousness and colour our whole
existence. Merleau-Ponty was inspired by Gestalt
psychology when he wrote about the dynamic figure-
ground structure where perceptions, thoughts, and
feelings may change from being in focus to lying at
the fringe of the experiential horizon and vice versa.
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An important aspect of the Gestalt principle is that
for the creation of meaning, the fringe of the horizon
is as important as the focal object. Moreover, any
change in the horizon may alter the whole meaning
of what is in focus for consciousness. There is no
doubt that the birth of a baby girl implied a major
alteration of Nina’s life. However, it was not the
baby girl herself, but the meaning she had for Nina
that changed her mode of existence. Nina’s world is
once again dominated by abusers and victims, only
now it is her child and not herself that is perceived as
a victim and all men are abusers, not only her father.
Merleau-Ponty (1962) explains that new perceptions
and new emotions may replace the old ones, but that
it is only the content that changes and not the
structure of experience. The traumatic ‘‘memory’’
that dominates Nina’s life is not representational. It
survives as ‘‘as a manner of being and with a certain
degree of generality’’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 83).
This past is not like a dated memory, a representa-
tion of the past that can be made present in Nina’s
consciousness; rather it determines the structure of
her consciousness that constitutes her past as her
true present and future.
Traumatic memories seem to be lingering in the
horizon of her consciousness and may at any time
become the focus of her attention. Even though
Nina directs her attention elsewhere, the traumatic
memories form the background of her experience,
giving the focal intentional object its form and
colour. She is not unconscious of her trauma, but
chooses not to address it directly. Merleau-Ponty
(1962) supports this description: ‘‘Forgetfulness is
. . . an act; I keep the memory at an arm’s length, as I
look past a person whom I do not wish to see’’ (p.
162). Contextual changes, such as the birth of a
baby girl, may change and reorganise the whole
experiential Gestalt, where the memories of CSA
prevail in Nina’s effort to create meaning in her lived
world.
Experience has an ever-present atmosphere of
elusiveness, of something incomplete and out of
reach (Shapiro, 1976). Experience is therefore filled
with tension; it is both a threat and an attraction. We
may never fulfil the elusive event; it might continue
to hover over us. The elusiveness of experience is
evident in Merleau-Ponty’s object-horizon structure
as it implies that we can only focus on one facet of an
object at the same time, while all the other facets are
present as possibilities for approach. Thus, the
horizon presents possibilities that might be experi-
enced in the future. These possibilities afford
approaching, they afford straining at or leaning
towards. Incest dominates Nina’s world and her
possibilities for action are restricted by this perceived
world. Minkowski (1970) states that the opposite of
action is expectation. In action we move towards the
future. But in expectation the future closes in on us,
moving towards us. And expectation always implies
intense anguish as it is a suspension of activity*
activity which is ‘‘life itself,’’ as Minkowski (1970,
p. 88) writes. To stay in anguish over time is
unbearable; action must overcome expectation.
Nina acts in an attempt to reduce overwhelming
anguish when she seeks information about CSA on
the Internet. But unfortunately for Nina, the action
of seeking information does not overcome the
uncertainty; instead it feeds and colours the expecta-
tion, creating intense anguish. Her anguish-creating
action stalls time, which is an important aspect of
depression (Minkowski, 1970). Anxiety and depres-
sion are thus intertwined in the structure of Nina’s
experience. They are two sides of the same coin.
Discussion
Nina’s re-entry into a world of abuse may be
interpreted as the need to work through and master
her experience of CSA. However, the way she acts in
this world does not lead to any mastery or learning;
on the contrary, it increases anxiety and depression.
What is more, Nina describes how she seeks
destructive information against her better judge-
ment. Her search for information about CSA on
the Internet seems partly involuntary. A possible
explanation for the driven, persistent quality of such
behaviour may lie in Freud’s concept of repetition
compulsion (Freud, 1958). The individual feels
compelled to repeat the repressed material as con-
temporary experience. Fairbairn (1986) explains
repetition compulsion as the effort to master trau-
matic experience through a fixation on a painful
situation. In this view, repetition compulsion may be
an unconscious repetition of a traumatic relationship
with a traumatising bad object, where the subject has
a concealed hope that the bad object eventually will
turn into a good object. From this perspective, Nina
hopes that she (or her mother) will be able to protect
her children (or herself) from abuse. If not, she
hopes that she (or her mother) at least will be able to
detect it and punish the abusive man (or her father),
i.e., that the mother in the end will prove to be good.
We could also assume that she hopes that the men
(or her father) in her surroundings do not end up
abusing her children and, thus, also in the end turn
out to be good. Thus, repetition compulsion can be
seen as an attempt to master a situation by wanting
unconsciously to go through the same situation, and
hoping that it does not end badly as it did in the past.
The person who repeats compulsively is then de-
scribed as loyal to her primary objects, despite the
traumatic and difficult relationship to them. The loss
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of a ‘‘bad’’ primary object is, according to Fairbairn,
equal to an objectless world, which is experienced as
far more distressing because it also implies the loss of
parts of the original ego.
Nina holds very painful memories and anxiety that
thrust her away from her focal consciousness. In
recent psychoanalytic literature, Bromberg (2003)
theorises that traumatic events that we find difficult
to incorporate are dissociated away from the self as a
‘‘not-me,’’ in order to protect the perceived vulner-
able self. Thus, a part of oneself becomes detached
and hidden in the unconscious. Somehow, however,
the detached part continues to hover over the
person, as the dissociation is not complete. The
conscious self still has some access to the ‘‘not-me.’’
The previously dissociated ‘‘not-me’’ experiences are
enacted by transference and projection into the
surrounding world.
In this psychodynamic line of thinking, Nina’s
emotional and pre-symbolic memories are lived as a
real threat in the present and near future, the threat
of sexual abuse of her children. Nina does indeed
seem to exist in a world full of perpetrators and
victims. Her feelings towards her abusive father can
be said to be transferred or redirected towards all
other men. She somehow transfers her past into the
present and the future, and projects her own feelings
onto her children, who thus take on the role of
victims. Thus a possible psychodynamic interpreta-
tion is that Nina’s compulsion to seek destructive
information on the Internet is motivated by complex
and contradictory emotions connected to her
trauma.
The concepts of transference, projection, dissocia-
tion, and repetition compulsion rest theoretically on
the construct of the unconscious. Nina’s repetition
compulsion is then explained by unresolved conflicts
that are repressed into her unconscious and that
motivate her recurring projection and transference.
What really only exists in Nina’s mind is uncon-
sciously transferred and projected onto the world
and the people around her.
In his seminal book from 1972 A different existence
van den Berg directs our attention to this way of
reasoning. The concept of projection, van den Berg
points out, implies that something within the person
departs from her, moves towards and attaches itself
to objects and other persons in the world. In the case
of transference, a feeling that she has for one person
can detach itself from that person and latch onto
other people in the world. Thus transference and
projection indicate that emotions can be objectless
and attached to other objects at will. van den Berg
infers from this that these psychodynamic concepts
imply that the person in essence is detached from the
world and others. This in turn means that transfer-
ence and projection imply a negation of the person’s
reality. ‘‘Transference’’ denies what the person sees
in others and ‘‘projection’’ denies what the person
sees in the here and now; the person sees only herself
(Giorgi, 1985; van den Berg, 1972). In a more
recent critique of such Cartesian trends in psycho-
dynamic thinking, Stolorow, Orange, and Atwood
(2001) point out that this ‘‘doctrine bifurcates the
subjective world into outer and inner regions [and]
reifies the resulting separation between the two’’
(p. 469). The mind appears as an isolated container
of internalised relationships that can be studied
largely detached from the surrounding context.
Taking seriously Nina’s account of her situation,
and in consistence with our research method, we
prefer the phenomenological understanding of how
incest and depression intertwine in Nina’s lifeworld.
In doing so we open up for mental health work
grounded in and directed at her illness experience.
This experience gives her little room to act: Nina’s
anxiety and depression are two sides of the same coin;
that is, aspects of a world with a ‘‘frozen’’ structure in
which all new experiences are given old meaning. For
the mental health worker or psychotherapist this
would imply that instead of seeking incidents in the
past that serve as causal explanations for current
problems, it may be more fruitful to concentrate on
the patient’s current difficulties and elaborate on her
situation in the here and now*helping to ‘‘melt
down’’ the frozen structure. In her world the pro-
blems lie in her non-knowledge, in what she is not
directly conscious of, but which severely restricts her
potentialities (Mook, 1985). In therapy the aim is to
tactfully and gradually reduce her restricting non-
knowledge and to uncover what her limited mode of
existence means to her. Thereby the therapist gra-
dually introduces the unfolding possibilities of ex-
istence for her. Thus, instead of speaking of
transference and projection, the therapist accepts
the client’s descriptions of her world. Nina’s pro-
blems lay in her relationship to significant others in
her world and it is in this world that she has to regain
her health (Mook, 1985). The therapist could start
working with the fact that Nina has difficulty trusting
men in her surroundings and what this difficulty
actually means for her. As both past and future meet
in the present, their appearance is dependent on how
we view them from the present. It follows that it is
Nina’s present mode of existence in her world and the
consequences it has for her that we must take
seriously and not a superimposed theory.
Conclusion
Through a case study we analysed how a mother’s
experiences with incest and PPD intertwine. Using
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Giorgi’s phenomenological method of analysis we
derived a contextualised meaning structure of the
experience. In this structure, traumatic past experi-
ences merge with destructive present behaviour and
anxiety-filled expectations about the future. Past,
present, and future pivot around sexual abuse by
untrustworthy men. The psychodynamic under-
standing of this meaning structure of experience
emphasises projection and transference as concepts
bridging past, present, and future. Together with the
concept of repetition compulsion, projection and
transference may explain the participant’s mode of
being in generic terms. But we preferred to stay close
to Nina’s specific descriptions of the world she lives
in and moved on to a phenomenological under-
standing. This allowed us to describe Nina’s per-
ceived past and future as intricately related to her
here and now intertwining experiences of anxiety
and depression.
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